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Abstract 
Stock market bubbles are known to cause economic and financial disruption. Previous research 
has explored factors contributing towards the formation of bubbles, however, the effectiveness of 
bubble mitigation strategies is under researched. I hypothesise that by employing a nudging 
technique, alerting respondents to deviations between trading prices and intrinsic value of the 
assets, trading prices will converge to intrinsic value, thus averting bubble formation. An 
experimental continuous double auction market is employed to test this hypothesis. I find that 
nudging impacts bubble formation characteristics: amplitude, normalised absolute deviation and 
turnover are reduced, and asset prices trade closer to their intrinsic values. These results 
demonstrate that deviations from intrinsic values can be attributed to individual choices, and 
speculative tendency rather than to a lack of information. Nudges that provide traders with the 
intrinsic value are therefore an effective and applicable technique to mitigate bubble formations 
by reducing the participants' speculative behaviour. 
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1. Introduction 
At the time of writing (2017), the global economy is facing an unstable economic environment 
characterised by low interest rates, high real estate prices, and soaring stock markets globally. 
These conditions, and perhaps predominantly, the low interest rates which are known to attract 
inexperienced and uninformed investors to the stock market, who speculate in order to seek 
improved capital returns, lead to asset bubble formations (Kindleberger 1996; Shiller 2001). An 
economic bubble is an event where an asset or several assets’ prices are inflated beyond their 
intrinsic value (Phillips and Yu 2011). Economic bubbles have been known to result in economic 
inefficacies due to the misallocation of resources. Price bubbles send incorrect price signals, 
distort markets and result in loss of economic prosperity (Noussair, CN and Powell 2010). An 
example for such a scenario is the ‘Dot Com’ Bubble that occurred between 1997 – 2002 (Pastor 
and Veronesi 2006), and is depicted in “Figure 1: The ‘Dot Com’ Bubble” below. 
Figure 1: The ‘Dot Com’ Bubble 
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While policy makers try to inhibit financial bubbles through greater levels of information and 
macro prudential policies (Oliver 2013), it is a fact that asset bubbles and in particular stock 
market bubbles are reoccurring (Kindleberger 1996). Solving or mitigating this phenomenon 
could benefit the wealth of individual and institutional investors. 
The field of behavioural economics is focusing on human factors in economic decision making. 
Thaler, Richard H. and Sunstein (2008) argued that economic decisions are attributed to human 
behavioural factors, while others suggest that conventional economic theory models provide 
sufficient explanation to economic decisions (Altman 2012). The field of behavioural finance is 
focusing on financial markets, and is offering an alternative view to the common and traditional 
financial markets efficiency theory. This view claims that financial markets are inefficient due to 
irrationality of market participants, and that systematic and significant deviations are expected to 
occur over extended periods of time. Similar to behavioural economics, behavioural finance 
theory also supports these claims empirically (Shleifer 2000). Theories and methods offered by 
both streams provide alternative and/or complementary explanations to the traditional economic 
and financial theories. For example, while lower interest rates can be identified as a cause for 
speculative investments, behavioural factors like herding, a phenomenon where an individual or 
a group are following a thought leader’s behaviour, is also considered a significant contributor to 
bubble formations (Shiller 2001).  
Empirical analysis of financial markets may be challenging, as those markets are impacted by 
noise traders. This thesis utilises a well-established experimental economics/finance bubble 
triggering methodology (Smith et al. 1988), which allows for experimental replicability and 
control of significant variables, such as an intrinsic value, throughout the experiment. This ability 
is not available in real-life financial markets, making it difficult to isolate causal factors. This 
thesis also employs three well accepted bubble formation measures: price amplitude, normalised 
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absolute deviation, and turnover to assess the bubble severity (King et al. 1993; Porter and Smith 
1995; Van Boening et al. 1993). Nudging, also referred to as libertarian paternalism, is the ability 
of institutions to affect individual behaviour while allowing for individual choices to made 
(Sugden 2009). Nudging attempts to influence individuals’ behaviour, with a foreseeable 
outcome, by allowing non-regulatory, voluntary choices (Oliver 2013). By applying a novel 
approach that utilises a nudging technique in conjunction with the above bubble triggering 
mechanism, this thesis investigates whether real time nudging can mitigate the formation of asset 
bubbles in an experimental asset market, to provide insights into the effectiveness of nudges in 
economic decision making. 
Ten groups of participants took part in this study. The groups were allocated to three types of 
treatments: baseline groups (control) were performing a single asset trading in a multi period set 
environment. Nudge groups followed the same settings, with the addition of exposure to general 
(text only) and specific (numbers and percentage difference) intrinsic value nudges during 
trading. The groups were ethnically heterogeneous. A market composition is known to yield less 
bubbles and crashes compared to homogeneous groups (Levine et al. 2014). The groups had also 
a higher female representation, which is also known to reduce bubble formations (Eckel and 
Füllbrunn 2015). Two research questions were investigated by this thesis. Firstly, how will 
different intrinsic value general nudging methods impact price amplitude, normalised absolute 
deviation, and turnover in an experimental setting? Secondly, how will different intrinsic value 
specific nudging methods impact price amplitude, normalised absolute deviation, and turnover in 
an experimental setting? The results for these questions indicated that the baseline groups 
significantly deviated from the intrinsic value, and that the nudged groups yielded significantly 
reduced bubble formation measures (King et al. 1993; Porter and Smith 1995; Van Boening et al. 
1993) compared to the baseline groups, therefore supporting the hypothesis that nudging can 
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reduce bubble formation. As a result, the findings of this thesis contribute to both behavioural 
economics and behavioural finance, and provide support for an existing nudge theory by 
confirming the effectiveness of nudges in financial markets settings. Importantly, knowing that 
price distortion caused by investors’ speculations can be mitigated using nudging may help 
governments to set new policies regarding information that can reduce asset pricing speculation 
and bubble formation for assets with a known intrinsic value (real value). This can inherently 
reduce financial damages to individuals and governments. 
This thesis articulates the ideas and findings in the following order: Chapter two sets the 
theoretical background for this thesis. Chapter three discusses the experimental design. The 
results and related analyses are reported in chapter four. The final chapter, chapter five, presents 
conclusions and future recommendations. Lastly, the appendices provide additional details of the 
experimental settings, revealing how the information was delivered and explaining interaction 
and experience the participants had with the trading system in this study.  
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2. Literature and Theory Review 
2.1 Introduction 
Economic bubbles have been known to negatively affect investors (Noussair, CN and Powell 
2010) for hundreds of years (Johnson and Tellis 2005). A significant amount of research has 
addressed stock market bubbles and the different biases related to their formation. Since 
economic bubbles produce damaging financial consequences, including potential spill-over 
effects that cause damages beyond the specific asset bubble (Palan 2009), solutions mitigating 
bubbles may benefit corporates and individuals alike, by helping them to make informed 
investment decisions, and thus preserving their capital. Governments may also profit, as they will 
not need to address the financial crisis that is often caused by the bubbles. However, while there 
are numerous contributing factors to the formation of bubbles and their inevitable bust, there is a 
debate about the effectiveness of existing mitigation strategies (Altman 2012; Porter and Smith 
2003).  
 
One solution that can be used to mitigate bubbles and bursts, originates from the field of 
behavioural economics and behavioural finance. While the field of behavioural economics aims 
to explain behavioural anomalies of all economic agents’ decisions, whether in financial markets 
or other economic environments (Thaler, Richard H. 2016), behavioural finance clarifies the 
motivation underlying investors decisions in financial markets. Both behavioural economics and 
behavioural finance create coherent theoretical models, utilising both psychological and 
economic theories, to design economic models, analyse, and explain their empirical outcomes 
(Thaler, R 1999). Both fields have benefited from the introduction of experimental economics 
and experimental finance, employing laboratory experiments to test hypotheses in confined and 
controlled environments. These controlled settings allow to rectify an influence of potential 
confounding variables, and to focus on specific facets of the research questions. As described 
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later in this thesis, to trigger bubbles in a laboratory environment, this study incorporated one of 
the most established experimental economics/finance settings and analysis methods. 
 
In this literature review, I will initially define economic bubbles, followed by a discussion of 
several biases and phenomena that contribute to bubble formation. The last section of this review 
will discuss bubble mitigating factors, and the possible uses of intrinsic value nudging, as a 
method to alert investors about existing differences between the intended purchasing/selling 
price and the actual value of economic assets. 
 
2.2 Economic Bubbles 
Definition and Overview 
Economic bubbles are commonly defined by rising prices to a level that significantly surpasses 
the intrinsic value of an asset (Phillips and Yu 2011). Intrinsic value, also known as fundamental 
value or real value, is defined as the estimated (risk adjusted) discounted dividend stream of an 
asset (Smith et al. 1988). Dividends are periodic payments that companies pay their shareholders. 
Discounted dividend stream is the estimated total dividends paid by the company over time, 
discounted by the market risk-free rate. 
 
Asset valuation is most accurate when an economic market prices assets solely based on their 
fundamentals. This allows informed investors (those who have all the required knowledge about 
the asset), to confidently assign their funds into assets that will yield future profitability. 
However, due to speculation and other reasons that will be described in this review, asset prices 
may deviate from their fundamentals, while forming price bubbles and bursts. This in turn affects 
the investors’ returns (Noussair, CN and Powell 2010). 
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Economic bubbles are well-documented throughout history. There is evidence for more than four 
hundred years of bubbles and busts. During the ‘Tulip Mania’, Dutch investors in the 1600s saw 
the price of tulip bulbs rise by over 500 percent only to later drop 90 percent from its’ peak when 
the market crashed (Garber 1990). A century later, the ‘South Sea Company’ bubble formed in 
the United Kingdom. During this bubble, the South Sea Company stock peaked at a value that 
was 843 percent more than its’ initiation value, only to drop 88 percent of its’ value from that 
peak point (Temin and Voth 2004). In the early 20th century, after a series of speculative price 
hikes, the Dow Jones Industrial Index (DJI) finally crashed by 91 percent between the years 1929 
and 1932. This crash was later known as the ‘1929 Wall Street Crash’ (French and Poterba 
1991). Roughly 70 years later, during the ‘Dot Com Bubble’, the NASDAQ index fell by 78 
percent (Pastor and Veronesi 2006) (Noussair, CN and Powell 2010). 
 
A notable type of bubble is called an intrinsic bubble. An intrinsic bubble’s variability is only 
derived by exogenous economic factors and consequent expectations of the market participants, 
ignoring any extraneous effects or influence, such as changes to monetary policy. Therefore, they 
are highly susceptible to the asset’s economic fundamentals such as its dividend distribution. It 
was also argued that consistency in the exogenous factors is required to maintain those bubbles, 
for example, a linear dividend stream (Froot and Obstfeld 1991). Further research by Smith et al. 
(2000) supported these claims. 
 
Specific asset bubbles can also affect unrelated asset markets. There are several documented 
cases where money originating from one bubble burst has been reallocated into more secure 
assets at that time, while inflating those secure assets beyond their intrinsic value, therefore 
creating bubbles in those assets later down the track. One such striking example is the subprime 
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crisis in North America that saw significant housing market increases from 2000, a peak in 2005 
and an inevitable crash between 2007 and 2008. During the bust phase, investors who were 
seeking safer alternative investment options, reassigned their investment funds to assets such as 
bonds and commodities (for example, oil). This, in turn, created value bubbles in those latter 
assets (Phillips and Yu 2011). 
 
While asset bubbles are not limited to a specific asset or market, this thesis will focus on stock 
market bubbles and, in particular, intrinsic bubbles.  
Identifying Bubbles 
In order to identify stock market bubbles, it is important to acknowledge that there might be a 
difference between the intrinsic value and the current market value of an asset. Although theory 
suggests that the market value of assets converge to their intrinsic value (Smith et al. 1988), and 
that in an efficient market asset prices accurately signal investors the security intrinsic value 
(Noussair, CN and Powell 2010), it may be impossible to forecast the actual dividends paid by 
the companies over extended future periods. This is mainly related to the fact that dividend 
distribution may change over time due to the companies’ profits, losses and investment 
strategies. With that in mind, calculating precise intrinsic value based on discounted dividend 
stream may be challenging (Shiller 2014). Moreover, research has shown that intrinsic value 
calculations may result in different value to the actual market price of the asset due to emotional, 
non-fundamental factors, such as greed or animal spirits - an emotive driven behaviour rather 
than conventional calculated economic behaviour, and overconfidence (Altman 2012; Thaler, R 
1999).   
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Assets that are traded at higher volumes with significant positive deviation from their intrinsic 
value over time, considered to be in a bubble state. Once the market realises that the value is 
inflated, investors tendency for speculation is reduced, buyers become scarce, and holders of 
current assets become more willing to sell their assets at lower prices. This causes assets value to 
drop and converge to its’ intrinsic value or in some cases, even below its’ intrinsic value, thus 
forming a bubble burst (Lei et al. 2001). Barro and Ursúa (2009), who performed a vast research 
on economic bubbles and crashes, show that any negative yearly return of 25 percent or more, 
can be defined as a market crash. 
 
While it may be challenging to identify an existing bubble, it can be retrospectively confirmed by 
studying historical price patterns of the related assets. Asset prices tend to rapidly increase in 
value and move away from their intrinsic value without any evident supporting information, only 
to reach a peak and then retract to their intrinsic value or lower at the end of the burst stage 
(Phillips and Yu 2011). Additionally, in a controlled laboratory environment, researchers can 
evaluate stock market bubbles severity by using empirical measures. Such measures have been 
developed by pioneering researchers in the field of experimental economics (King et al. 1993; 
Porter and Smith 1995; Van Boening et al. 1993). These measure include: Price Amplitude, 
defined as the difference between the peak and the trough of mean period prices relative to the 
asset (share) intrinsic value, normalized by the initial asset intrinsic value; Normalized Absolute 
Deviation, that is the sum of all transactions in a market, expressed as the absolute deviations of 
prices from the intrinsic value, divided by the total number of assets outstanding; And Turnover, 
the total number of trading transactions in a market, divided by the total number of assets 
outstanding (Noussair, C and Tucker 2006). High values of Price Amplitude and Normalized 
Absolute Deviation indicate severe bubbles. Turnover analysis depends on the trading patterns. 
While high Turnover and deviation from the intrinsic value indicate severe bubbles, trading with 
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high Turnover and prices that converge to the intrinsic value imply competitive market rather 
than a bubble (Smith et al. 2000). 
Formation and Bursts 
Seminal studies by Smith et al. (1988), and Smith (1994) suggest that bubbles are formed when 
market participants do not share the rationale underlying their decisions, despite having the same 
information. This leads ‘rational’ traders to believe that there are ‘irrational’ traders who are 
willing to buy assets above the intrinsic value. While the ‘rational’ traders are aware of the 
asset’s intrinsic value, they believe that ‘irrational’ are unaware of the intrinsic value.  With that 
in mind, the ‘rational’ traders then speculatively acquire assets with the intention to sell them to 
the ‘irrational’ traders at higher prices, ignoring the intrinsic value of the assets. Due to the rising 
speculative demand, the asset prices are pushed up and detach from the intrinsic value. The 
prices keep rising until there are no foreseeable opportunities for profit. At that point, the peak of 
the bubble, speculative demand declines, prices start to drop, and the bubble bursts (Noussair, C 
and Tucker 2006). 
 
While speculation appears to be an important phenomenon in bubble formation, there are 
additional notable phenomena that have been observed during previous bubbles formation and 
bursts. Many analysts explain the formation of the ‘Dot Com’ bubble by prior increases in price, 
rather than fundamental reasoning (Johnson and Tellis 2005). Therefore, price increase by itself 
may be an important contributing factor to bubble formation. Leverage and lack of 
diversification have been also shown to contribute to bubble formation. Shiller (2014) claims that 
the severity of the 2008 housing bubble in North America was mainly caused by undiversified 
leverage. Moreover, many investors in the 2008 housing bubble were lured into the market by 
mortgages offering low interest rates. This allowed investors to divert their low interest, risk free 
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investments, into lucrative, leveraged real estate investments. Those new investments held low 
interest liabilities in the near term. However, the liabilities did contain a significant potential for 
interest hikes in the foreseeable future, which those investors chose to ignore, thus taking on 
more potential risk than they might have been able to deal with, if their personal wealth or 
employment status changed for the worse, indicating that changes in interest rates play an 
important role in risk taking and bubble formations (Phillips and Yu 2011).  
 
The theoretical framework presented above explains bubble formation and bursts. To provide a 
complete review however, additional aspects are required to be investigated. Such aspects are 
related to common human behaviour, predominantly recognition heuristics and behavioural 
biases, that influence trading patterns, ultimately promoting bubble formations. 
 
2.3 Causes for Bubbles: The effects of human behaviour 
There are many contributing factors to bubble formation. This section will focus on some of the 
more significant behavioural factors and biases. 
Herding 
Keynes (1936) suggested that investors’ decisions are irrational and predominantly determined 
by their animal spirits, or in other words, the investors’ instincts, tendencies and emotions. At 
times, this behaviour can lead to economic decisions that are not based on economic 
fundamentals. For instance, animal spirits may be driven by other investors behaviour or by 
future market expectations that are based on rumours (Park and Sgroi 2011). Alternatively, there 
are also cases where investors’ decisions can be considered as rational. When an individual 
investor identifies a thought leader, such as a famous stocks analyst, they are likely to follow 
their information signals and trading patterns (Park and Sgroi 2011). This recognition heuristic is 
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known as herding.  Herding is known to produce asset value cascades, which divert asset prices 
away from their intrinsic value (Shiller 2001) and could potentially lead to bubble formations 
and bursts (Altman 2012). 
  
Avery and Zemsky (1998) proposed that stock markets require three different types of 
uncertainties in order to induce herd behaviour, leading to bubble formation. The first type is 
Value Uncertainty, where market participants are not confident that their evaluation of an asset is 
accurate. The second is Event Uncertainty, where market participants are not confident why an 
asset value has changed from its initial expected value. The third is Composition Uncertainty, 
where market participants are uncertain, about the proportion of traders who have asset-related 
information (informed), and those who do not (uninformed). Therefore, in poorly informed 
markets (more uninformed traders than informed traders), informed traders will buy securities 
they have information about, which, in turn, will drive asset prices up. This will trigger 
mimicking behaviour by uninformed traders, who assume the presence of unknown information 
about those securities. Eventually, once it is clear that the market is poorly informed, the asset 
value will depreciate back to its’ intrinsic value or even below that (Avery and Zemsky 1998). 
Herding can also be impacted by asset behaviour in previous periods. Interestingly, while 
herding is apparent in assets that had recent positive performance, assets with past negative 
performance do not trigger herding behaviour (Grinblatt et al. 1995). 
Contributing Biases and Effects 
There are many other biases and behavioural patterns that can contribute to miscalculated 
economic choices, ultimately leading to bubble formation. De Bondt and Thaler suggest that 
overreaction can be caused by the “Recency effect” (De Bondt and Thaler 1985; De Bondt and 
Thaler 1987). This phenomenon leads people to assign more value to recent information than 
other information or their prior beliefs. Therefore, investors who are not aware of the intrinsic 
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value of an asset, may perceive the asset value too optimistically during the bubble formation or 
too pessimistically during the bubble burst, solely due to its’ current price (Offerman and 
Sonnemans 2004).  
 
Another bias that fuels the markets is the “House money effect”. This bias is triggered when 
investors make gains in the market. They perceive these gains as external money (in casinos, the 
house money) and become risk tolerant, as they can afford to lose this money without any 
financial implications to their initial funds (Thaler, R. H. and Johnson 1990). It is important to 
state that under this type of experimental settings, the fact that participants are endowed assets 
without having to work for them, which may be considered as an instance of the “House money 
effect”, does not appear to have significant effect on participants choices, compared to scenarios 
where participants are required to earn money to purchase their assets prior to the main 
experiment (Altman 2017). 
 
Research has also shown that the “Hot hand fallacy”, the use of past sequential information (that 
is, successes) in order to make decisions under uncertainty, is exploited by marketers of mutual 
funds, stocks and similar financial products. By aggressively advertising past positive 
performance of their offerings, and understating future pitfalls, they improve the demand for 
their products (Johnson and Tellis 2005). 
 
Another contributor, overconfidence, can lead investors to perceive their market knowledge and 
their asset valuation skills as far better than what they actually are. In turn, this belief may lead 
individuals to follow their overconfident decisions, make riskier choices, and to disregard the 
economic environment, disrupting the market and the assets they invest in (Shleifer 2000).  
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The endowment effect is a hypothesis that individuals ignore the market value of items they own, 
while attributing a higher value to the items, solely because they possess them (Thaler, R 1980). 
This effect is also known as divestiture aversion, a tendency to avoid reduction of assets owned 
(Altman 2012). During severe sell-off events in descending markets, such as bubble bursts, 
market participants who experience a decline in their asset value, are also likely to experience a 
related bias, the status-quo bias. This bias creates a tendency for individuals to keep their status 
unchanged solely due to decisions they made in the past (Samuelson and Zeckhauser 1988). 
These, in conjunction with loss aversion, the preference of people to take additional risk in order 
to avoid losses, which are twice as painful as gains are rewarding (Kahneman and Tversky 
1982), can lead individuals to keep their overvalued assets, in order to avoid immediate loss 
despite the realistic potential of an amplified loss in the future. 
 
It appears that herding and other key behavioural biases listed above, are likely to have 
significant effects on bubble formations, bursts and their severity. To complete this review, 
factors that may drive bubble formation will be covered in the following section. 
 
Additional Contributors to Bubble Formation 
There are additional contributors to bubble formations. Prior to the Dot Com bubble bust, Thaler, 
R (1999) has suggested that a bubble was forming by individual investors, who could not 
accurately valuate the intrinsic value of leading internet companies, that were trading at twice 
their market value compared to their actual intrinsic value. In addition, professional investors 
who are expected to valuate assets more precisely, and therefore reduce price bloating, did not 
help mitigating the forming bubble by investing against the market direction. This can be 
explained by various reasons: possible loss potential as a result of betting against the herd, 
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insufficient funds or pre-defined asset allocation constraints for the bigger funds. Therefore, asset 
prices kept increasing, until the buying spree stopped, and the bubble burst (Thaler, R 1999).  
Financial analysts and corporate executives are also known as contributors to bubble formations. 
Graham (1999) claimed that, analysts with good valuation reputation (to maintain their 
reputation), analysts with low valuation abilities (to avoid mistakes), or analysts with private 
information that is different than the strongly perceived public information about the asset, tend 
to herd by following the majority choices, and therefore supporting bubble formations. Roubini 
and Mihm (2010) argue that some corporate executives may also contribute to bubble formation, 
by setting goals and objectives that relate to their short-term (1-2 years) performance incentives. 
This leads to myopic horizon risk-reward calculation, as the executives are rewarded in the short 
term, but may not need to address the (possibly disastrous) consequences in the long term. 
Resembling behaviour can be observed by investment brokers and financial advisors who are 
similarly rewarded (Altman 2012). 
 
2.4 Mitigation of Bubbles 
Mitigating Factors 
Various factors can mitigate investors’ tendency to join a forming bubble. For instance, 
providing market participants with information about the intrinsic value of the asset, thus making 
the participants informed investors, makes them less likely to be drawn into a bubble (Porter and 
Smith 2003). However, under similar settings, when informed investors are mixed with 
participants who are not provided with information about the intrinsic value of the asset, 
therefore, making them uninformed investors, this mitigating effect is limited, as the uninformed 
investors drive the asset value up, causing the informed investors to be drawn into the bubble 
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(Porter and Smith 2003). Asset trading experience appears to be another mitigating factor. 
Inexperienced traders do not gain certainty about the rationale of other traders from knowing the 
potential dividend stream of an asset, or in other words, its’ intrinsic value. However, trading 
experience gained through trial and error decreases their uncertainty, and their trading converges 
to the asset intrinsic value (Smith et al. 1988). 
  
Financial education, such as money management skills, Microeconomics, and Macroeconomics 
knowledge, is also considered a mitigating factor to behavioural biases contributing to bubble 
formations. However, there are mixed views between the conventional economic theory 
(pessimistic), and the different behavioural economics streams (some are pessimistic, others 
optimistic), regarding its contribution to changing the decision-making process, and mitigating 
the biases effect. For instance, Thaler, Richard H. and Sunstein (2008), suggest that since 
behavioural biases are hard-wired, that is, they are instinctive by nature, financial education 
alone may not be efficient as a mitigating factor. Nevertheless, these, and other researchers in the 
field of behavioural economics have developed a useful theory that can be used to influence 
people choices, nudging (Altman 2012). 
Nudging 
Nudge theory incorporates aspects of human thought patterns, and ways for governments and 
other institutions to successfully influence individuals’ activities and economic choices, without 
forcing the desired decisions on the individuals (Thaler, Richard H. and Sunstein 2008). Nudges 
are designed by a ‘choice architect’ who ensures that nudges do not apply an additional monetary 
penalty to force individuals to make the suggested choices. Since nudges are choices that 
individuals make, they can be easily and cheaply avoided by simply ignoring them or making a 
different choice to what the nudge suggests (Oliver 2013). Nudges are commonly used by 
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governments via their behavioural insights or nudge units, as a method to encourage what is 
perceived by the policy makers as appropriate behaviour (Thaler, Richard H. and Sunstein 2008). 
It is important to highlight that while some of the most effective nudges are based on previous 
empirical finding in behavioural science research, not all nudges will work in real life as they 
may fail to capture possible variations in human responses to the nudge (Sunstein 2014).  
 
It is also important to mention that while most nudges are regarded as positive in both their 
intentions and “call for action” methods, there are nudges that may be perceived as negative. For 
example, one of the nudges used by the ‘choice architects’ at the “Behavioural Insights Team” is 
aimed to improve car tax payments. Violators are sent letters that include a picture of a car 
similar to their own car in model and colour. This strategy has been known to improve the 
payment rates. However, it can be argued that using such method may apply unnecessary stress 
to some car owners. Sugden (2009) claims that the application of nudging does not allow for 
individual free choice, but is a trade-off between the restriction of individual choices set by the 
‘choice architect’. While ‘choice architects’ set the options to nudge the individual towards the 
‘right’ decision and have the intent to cause positive reduction of individual error, placing 
individuals in such scenarios may not represent a free choice environment that suits all 
individuals. 
 
Nudges can come in many forms and shapes. Sunstein (2014) ranked ten important nudges. Out 
of those highly effective nudges, the most notable nudges which are relevant for this review are 
the following: “Default Rules” - a default option that is already pre-selected for the individual in 
case no other choice is made. For example, in order to save paper, a default of double sided page 
printing is set and used, if no other (single side page printing) is selected. Opposing to “Default 
Rules” is “Active Choice” which enforces the individual to make an actual choice at decision 
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points, while disallowing any default options nor progress before the choice is made. For 
example, before purchasing an asset, an investor is presented with a window containing two 
options, “Confirm” and “Cancel”. An investor must make a conscious decision whether to 
proceed with the transaction or not, by choosing one of the options. “Disclosure” - providing 
simplified, coherent, accessible and complete information about economic costs and possible 
outcomes related to an activity.  For example, disclosing the transaction costs associated with 
trading. “Warnings, graphic, or otherwise“ - required when substantial risks are involved in an 
activity. For instance, highlighting the potential risks associated with trading in the stock market. 
Messages are displayed using noticeable graphic elements, such as large fonts, bold letters and 
vivid colours. All of these tactics are known to be effective in triggering attention (Sunstein 
2013, 2014). It is important to note however, that while this nudge is quite effective, some 
individuals may discount it. Therefore, in order to achieve effective messages, additional trialling 
and perhaps a reward system has to be used in conjunction, in order to promote the desired 
behaviour (Sunstein 2013, 2014). 
Mitigating Bubbles with Intrinsic Value Nudging 
Based on the above literature review and discussion leading to this section, it appears that 
nudging investors with intrinsic value is an unexplored concept. Therefore, this section will 
present several possible economic bubble mitigation strategies utilising intrinsic value nudging. 
 
Kahneman (2011) categorised human thinking processes to two alternatives: fast (system 1), an 
intuitive, unconscious, approach that does not require thorough analysis and may lead to 
disadvantaged consequences due to the lack of complete comprehension and judgement of the 
current scenario; and slow (system 2), a conscious approach that requires thorough information 
and thought process and is perceived to yield more reliable outcomes. Using this terminology, by 
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providing traders with sufficient information about the difference between the offered price and 
the asset intrinsic value is expected to lead to slow, reflective thinking (system 2) about their 
offer, which should result in conscious and balanced decision.  
 
By using a combination of “Disclosure”, “Warnings, graphic, or otherwise“ and, “Active choice” 
in conjunction with the asset intrinsic value, the following activities and flow-on effects are 
expected in the nudge treatments:  in cases where investors are attempting to purchase an 
overvalued or undervalued asset, the investors will be provided with a message containing the 
relevant nudge. This will ensure that the investors make an active choice whether to purchase an 
asset. As a result, the investors preferences will be revealed (Sunstein 2013). Investors in the 
specific nudge treatments are also considered being well informed, as they are provided with the 
actual value of the asset via exact price difference information. Therefore, the investors would no 
longer be required to evaluate the asset intrinsic value, which will eliminate the value 
uncertainty. Having been provided with the asset intrinsic value, the “Recency Effect” may be 
triggered, the investors will form beliefs based on the provided asset’s intrinsic value rather than 
the current market value. This is expected to reduce the investors herding participation, and as a 
direct result, the investors contribution to the bubble formation. It is important to note that in the 
specific nudges treatment, in order to improve the nudge effect, investors receive information 
containing the exact price difference as well as the percentage difference from the current 
intrinsic value. This approach is chosen in order to accommodate different comprehension of 
numeric calculations, either percentage or currency differences, across the population (Newall 
and Love 2015). It is also important to highlight that providing the asset intrinsic value may not 
affect all the bubble contributing factors.  For example, providing the intrinsic value may have 
limited impact on the “Hot hand fallacy” and the “House money effect”, as both rely on past 
events and not on the asset’s intrinsic value. 
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Additional support for the nudging strategies can be found in the marketing literature and more 
specifically, product pricing. This literature shows that by offering discounts to promote product 
purchases, different types of cues will have different effect on consumers. In particular, two 
types of cues are relevant for this study: semantic cues, that use text or signs to attract 
consumers’ attention to an event such as discounted price. For example, “Sale, 50% off”. And, 
comparative cues that likewise make use of text or signs with an addition of comparison aspect 
to the previous state of the offer. For example, “Sale, 50% off, $10 before, now only $5”. 
Semantic cues are most effective when the price is low and the discount is low, while 
comparative cues are most effective when the price is high and the discount is high. Using this 
approach, in the context of the current research, the general nudge, which provides limited 
information, is represented by a semantic cue, whereas the specific nudge, which provides 
specific comparison information, is represented by a comparative cue (Grewal et al. 2014; Gupta 
and Cooper 1992). 
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2.5 Summary 
Economic bubbles have been known to form and burst for hundreds of years, leaving significant 
negative financial impact as a reminder to all the flawed non-fundamental factors and biases 
affecting investors. History has shown that as long as no active actions are applied to address 
these bubbles, they are likely to form and burst periodically.  
 
Previous research has shown that the odds of bubble formation are relatively low, when all 
investors are informed and aware of the asset intrinsic value. The odds of bubble formation 
change significantly when the market is shared with uninformed investors, who make investment 
choices based on speculation, thus dragging the market into bubble formation. Providing 
investors with the intrinsic value information of the traded asset before every transaction will 
ensure that all investors are informed.  
 
Research in behavioural economics has proven that well thought and tested nudges are an 
effective tool to change behavioural decisions. Researchers in experimental economics/finance 
developed a dedicated methodology that induces bubble creation in laboratory environments. 
Using intrinsic value in a controlled laboratory environment, in conjunction with targeted 
nudging, can lead to empirical findings regarding possibilities to alter behavioural patterns 
during asset trading. Choosing an appropriate information delivery method can also encourage 
investors to make better economic choices, subsequently leading to bubble formation mitigation. 
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3. Methods 
This chapter details the methods used to execute the experiments, and to evaluate the mitigating 
efficiency of nudging on asset bubbles in a laboratory setting. This chapter provides support and 
reasoning for the chosen methods, as well as explanations to challenges that have been resolved 
as part of the experimental design. 
3.1 Background 
Smith et al. (1988) established a methodology that can trigger bubbles in a controlled stock 
market trading simulation environment. Later on, leading researchers in the field of experimental 
economics (King et al. 1993; Porter and Smith 1995; Van Boening et al. 1993) developed three 
measures to evaluate stock market bubble severity:  
1. Price Amplitude: the difference between the peak and the trough of mean period prices 
relative to the asset (share) intrinsic value, normalized by the initial asset intrinsic value. 
Calculated as: 
maxt{(Pt - ƒt)/ƒ1} – mint{(Pt - ƒt)/ƒ1} 
Where Pt  and ft equal the average transaction price and the fundamental value in period 
t 
 
2. Normalized Absolute Deviation: the sum of all transactions in a market, expressed as the 
absolute deviations of prices from the intrinsic value, divided by the total number of 
outstanding assets. Calculated as: 
ƩtƩi | Pit - ƒt | / (100*TSU) 
Where ƩtƩi | Pit - ƒt | equals sum, over all transactions, of the absolute deviations of 
prices from the fundamental value. Pit is the price at which the ith transaction in period t 
occurs. TSU is the total stock of units. TSU equals the sum of all traders’ inventories of 
asset. Note that unlike the original calculation, this calculation divides the result by 
100*TSU rather than TSU in order to make the calculation comparable to previous 
studies which used cents instead of dollars which were used in this experiment.  
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3. Turnover: the total number of trading transactions in a market, divided by the total 
number of outstanding assets. Calculated as: 
  ƩtƩi / TSU 
 
 
Key: 
P = price 
ƒ = fundamental value / intrinsic value 
ƩtƩi = sum over all transactions 
TSU = total stock of units OR all stocks available 
(Noussair, C and Tucker 2006) 
Research Questions and Hypotheses  
Using the above methodology and measures, this thesis addresses two research questions:  
1. How will different intrinsic value general nudging methods impact price amplitude, 
normalised absolute deviation, and turnover in an experimental setting?  
2. How will different intrinsic value specific nudging methods impact price amplitude, 
normalised absolute deviation, and turnover in an experimental setting? 
Two hypotheses and six alternative sub-hypotheses are tested by this thesis. All hypotheses are 
tested using laboratory experiments. The hypotheses are listed below: 
Null hypothesis 1: Participants who are nudged with general information will not trade at a 
different price amplitude, normalised absolute deviation and turnover, than those who are not 
nudged. 
Alternative hypothesis 1.1: Participants who are nudged with general information will 
buy into a market at a lower price amplitude, than those who are not nudged. 
Alternative hypothesis 1.2: Participants who are nudged with general information will 
buy into a market at a lower normalised absolute deviation, than those who are not 
nudged. 
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Alternative hypothesis 1.3: Participants who are nudged with general information will 
buy into a market at a lower turnover, than those who are not nudged. 
 
Null hypothesis 2: Participants who are nudged with specific information will not trade at a 
different price amplitude, normalised absolute deviation and turnover, than those who are not 
nudged. 
Alternative hypothesis 2.1: Participants who are nudged with specific information will 
buy into a market at a lower price amplitude, than those who are not nudged. 
Alternative hypothesis 2.2: Participants who are nudged with specific information will 
buy into a market at a lower normalised absolute deviation, than those who are not 
nudged. 
Alternative hypothesis 2.3: Participants who are nudged with specific information will 
buy into a market at a lower turnover, than those who are not nudged. 
The experiment 
The experiment initially replicated Smith et al. (1988) methodology to create bubbles and bursts 
in a controlled lab environment using a Continuous Double Auction (CDA). CDA is a system by 
which traders are allowed to submit ASK (sell offers) and BID (buy offers) requests 
simultaneously to the market. A pre-defined rule-based mechanism was then used to match those 
offers (Noussair, CN and Powell 2010). Building on this framework, the experiment then aimed 
to show that using different nudging methods can reduce Price Amplitude, Normalized Absolute 
Deviation and Turnover, thus reducing bubbles formation. 
 
The experiment used three treatment variations. In variation #1, the control treatment, which 
replicates Smith et al. (1988) experiment, participants were not nudged at all. In variation #2, 
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participants were performing the same tasks as in variation #1, with the addition of a popup 
window nudge containing a warning text message suggesting that there is a difference between 
the proposed trade value and the actual value of the asset (where there is such a difference). In 
variation #3, participants were performing the same tasks as in variation #1, with the addition of 
a popup window nudge containing a warning text message and the actual difference in value and 
percentage between the proposed trade value and the actual value of the asset (where there was 
such a difference).  
 
Sunstein (2014) argued that disclosers and warnings in the form of a clear and accessible format 
are highly effective and are likely to trigger reaction and recognition of related messages into 
consideration. A popup window that interactively displays a clear message, conveying the 
differences between the offer price and the intrinsic value to the participants, in real time, 
implements the above approach. While other nudging methods can be used to alert participants 
to differences between the offered value and the real value, for example, using sounds whenever 
the threshold is breached. Presenting a custom, individual popup for each offer keeps the 
participant decisions discrete and reduces their impact on other participants’ decisions, compared 
to the example above. 
 
It is important to note that nudges were only triggered when a pre-defined threshold was met. In 
this experiment, nudges were triggered when the absolute price difference was more than 5 
percent. While it is not significantly higher or lower than the offered value, the 5 percent trigger 
was nominated since it still represents a notable difference from the offer value. The author did 
not find any previous evidence that has utilised this type of approach, therefore, no other 
benchmark trigger could be referred to. Group sizes were based on previous research 
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investigating the formation and busts of economic bubbles (Smith et al. 1988) and consisted of 
up to ten participants per experimental treatment. 
Sample size 
The initial sample size was planned to be limited to one pilot group of ten participants and three 
groups from each of the three treatments to a total of nine experimental groups. Overall, one 
hundred participants were expected to take part in the research phase. Repetition of the 
experiment with all three treatment groups would improve the ability to establish accurate 
statistical findings (as per the law of large numbers), as well as allowing a comparison between 
different behavioural patterns based on a wider demographic sample (Drehmann et al. 2005). 
Ethics 
All procedures described above were pre-screened by the members of RMIT University 
Behavioural Business Laboratory, and are in accordance with the University’s Human Ethics 
Committee approval. 
 
3.2 Participants 
Participants were recruited from the RMIT Behavioural Business Laboratory online recruitment 
system (ORSEE) (Greiner 2004). Participants were randomly selected with the only exception 
being that they must have been 18 years of age or older, as that is the minimum age required to 
legally trade shares. The different groups were run over several weeks. Participants were able to 
self-select the most convenient date for them. All participants were provided with the same 
generic experiment description. These ensured that participants’ group allocation allowed for 
randomised groups which are crucial for nudge empirical validation (Sunstein 2014). Up to 10 
participants took part in each group. While all efforts were made to ensure a consistent number 
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of participants in each group, there were some groups with less participants due to “no shows” (a 
total of 18 “no shows”). 
 
To take part in this study, all participants had to attend the behavioural laboratory in person. This 
supported the facilitation of the required trading education, and allowed the investigators to 
verify that each participant can understand the instructions, and is able to communicate with the 
experimental team, in case any clarifications were required. Additional descriptive information 
about the participants is provided in the results section. 
3.3 Experimental Software 
This experiment required the development of a proprietary software package. The solution was 
developed using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007) a commonly used experimental economic framework. 
Over 100 variables were used to manage and capture the participants’ behaviour and decisions 
(see appendix D). While most of the variables were used to calculate the results presented in the 
results section of this thesis, additional information was collected in order to enable extension of 
this thesis in the future. For example, the time passed between offer submission and contract 
completion, the time passed between a nudge popup and the offer cancellation, the amount of 
experimental money participants had at the time of offer submission and so forth.  
3.4 The experimental process 
After completing the recruitment process, a ten-minute orientation session was conducted to 
ensure participants’ understanding of the consent forms and the experiment instructions (see 
appendix A). One important item provided to the participants at this stage, was a printed copy of 
the “Estimated real values calculation table” or shortly, the “estimated values table”. This table 
lists estimated intrinsic values for a single asset at the end of each trading period. The table was 
provided to ensure that all participants have the same information about the asset value during 
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trading. Once all participants completed this stage, they were asked to open the experimental 
software. Participants were presented with a welcome screen. After the software identified that 
all participants saw the welcome screen, participants automatically progressed to the control 
questions screen. This screen consisted of three questions that were meant to ensure that the 
participants understood the instructions, and specifically the asset valuation mechanism, which 
this experiment follows. About 4-5 participants in each group were challenged by the control 
questions. Mostly, they were able to answer the questions after a brief (10-20 seconds) 
discussion with the experimenters who reminded the participants of the estimated values table 
they were provided with. In case the participant required an additional support, one of the 
experimenters came to explain the estimated values table in detail. Once all participants 
answered the control questions independently, the software automatically progressed the 
participants to the training session. 
 
During the training session, participants were provided with a printed “Training Instructions” 
(see appendix B), and were given five minutes to practice and get familiar with the trading 
system. Participants were told that their activities during this session will not affect their final 
outcome. Participants were allowed to ask additional questions during this period. Participants 
were also advised that they are free to decide whether to trade or refrain from trading during each 
round of the actual experiment. This was done to reduce active participation, a hypothesis that 
participants are choosing to trade in the experimental asset market even when it is uneconomical 
to do so, merely because trading in the asset market is the only activity available (Lei et al. 2001).  
 
Immediately after the participants completed the training session, they received two types of 
virtual assets to trade with, 10,000 experimental dollars (E$) and 10 experimental stocks (ES). 
Both the money and the stocks were assigned by the experimental trading software. It is 
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important to note that previous research did not find any significant differences between 
participants’ behaviour and decision making, in cases where they were required to earn the 
money or in other cases where they were given this money in this type of experimental setting 
(Paul et al. 2015) 
 
At this stage, they embarked on a stock market trading task consisting of fifteen trading periods 
of two minutes each. Participants were able to know how much E$ and ES they had at any given 
point via an on-screen display information. Participants were also able to check the estimated 
value of the asset by using a dedicated instructions button from the trading screen or read the 
printed estimated values table, provided to them at the start of the experiment. At the end of each 
period, participants were shown a period summary screen which displayed their dividend 
earnings for that period. At the end of the last period all assets were bought back at a random 
value, which was added to the participants’ E$ balance. Participants were presented with a final 
summary screen showing their final E$ balance, their rank, and the real payment they will 
receive once the experiment is concluded. 
 
At this stage, participants were asked to complete a demographic and risk attitude questionnaire 
using the same software. A questionnaire was utilised in order to collect data used to control for 
demographics, financial and trading experience, as well as willingness to take risks (Dohmen et 
al. 2011; Hsee and Weber 1999). Participants were also given an opportunity to provide written 
feedback about the experiment clarity, and any other feedback they deemed appropriate and 
useful to the investigators.  
 
After this stage, the experiment was complete and the participants were paid a 10 AUD showup 
fee, and an additional performance fee, which was calculated based on the participants’ choices 
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during the experiment. Participants were ranked based on the E$ amount they had at the end of 
the experiment. Based on the ranking, the highest ranked participant received 20 AUD, the next 
ranked participant received 2 dollars less (18 AUD) and so on. The tenth ranked participant 
received 2 AUD as their performance fee. Participants were rewarded to ensure their choices 
were based on potential decision-driven incentives. This principle followed economic theories 
that forecast how individuals and groups behave in the presence of real financial rewards 
(Croson 2005). 
 
In order to avoid experimenter demand effects (Zizzo 2009), participants were not told at any 
stage that the experiment was about bubble formation and mitigation methods. Demand effects 
are where the participants discover what the experiment is about, and try to please the researcher 
by doing what the researcher expects. 
 
Please refer to appendix C for additional information on how the trading screens and 
questionnaire were presented to participants. 
 
3.5 Data Analysis 
Quantitative data generated by the experimental software was extracted, transformed and loaded 
into Stata software for analysis purposes. An initial diagnostics analysis was carried out to 
identify data distribution, and to identify possible outliers. This was followed by descriptive 
statistics and specific bubble measurements analysis. Price Amplitude, Normalized Absolute 
Deviation, and Turnover were calculated for each treatment, to identify whether nudging had a 
significant effect on the participants’ behavioural choices. Mann Whitney U test, a non-
parametric test, was chosen to compare the three bubble measures between the different 
treatments. This test was deemed appropriate as the bubble measures are an aggregated 
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representation of the data, therefore, the compared sample size is small (less than 30). 
Additionally, normal distribution of the data could not have been assumed. It is important to 
highlight that while this test is two sided, it does not assert the direction of difference between 
the compared groups, therefore, in order to utilise conservative approach, it was decided not to 
divide the p values by half. Correlation and regression analysis were also performed to find 
additional relationships between the experimental variables and provide added insight into the 
collected data and behaviour patterns. 
A note on outliers 
All treatment groups were selected randomly from the university’s participants’ database without 
any pre-conditions or pre-filtering for asset trading experience. Inherently, this resulted in groups 
of participants with varied degrees of trading experience and knowledge. These differences were 
controlled for in the questionnaire, and further analysed in section 4.8, “Equity trading 
experience”. As a result, some offers and contracts were assessed as having a leverage which 
was influential beyond the level of speculative behaviour, and were attributed to extreme lack of 
participants’ experience. Outliers were identified as values higher than two standard deviations 
or more, compared to the mean values for the relevant experimental trading period. The total 
number of offers before outlier filtering was 9649. A total of 403 Outliers were excluded from 
the dataset at the preliminary stages of the analysis. To ensure that the removal of outliers did not 
materially affect the research questions results, Mann Whitney U test was run twice, once with 
and once without those records. No apparent effect was recorded. The removal of outliers did 
affect the graphical representation of one of the periods in the comparative graphs, and had 
minimal effect on the cancellation rate and number of completed transactions. 
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3.6 Summary 
This chapter described the methods used to trigger bubbles in a controlled laboratory 
environment, as well as the methods used to mitigate those bubbles. The chapter also described 
exact experimental flow, to allow for experimental repetition in future studies. Additional 
information about the software, the trading screens and variables are found in the appendices.  
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4. Results 
This chapter discusses the results of the experiments carried during this study. The chapter starts 
by describing the trading behaviour of different groups during the experiments. Later, the 
overarching research questions are addressed by presentation of the analysis performed on the 
bubble measures, followed by other aspects that the author found interesting and worth 
highlighting. For example, the differences between offers, which are the participants’ 
instructions to place a buy or sell request in the order book, and contracts that consist of 
corresponding matched buy and sell offers, were investigated thoroughly to examine differences 
in deviation from intrinsic value. Cancellation rate of both offers and contracts were also 
reviewed. Furthermore, differences in participants’ demographics, such as spoken language and 
origin were analysed, as well as correlation and several supporting regression models. 
 
4.1 Results Overview 
A total of 92 participants took part in the experiment. There were 10 experimental groups with a 
total of 83 participants, as well as a single pilot group with 9 participants. The pilot group was 
run in early September 2016. Information provided by the pilot group was used to improve the 
software, as well as the experimental flow. Following this, the experimental groups were run 
over a course of two weeks later that month. The experimental groups consisted of four baseline 
groups, three general nudge groups and three specific nudge groups. “Table 1: Participant 
Statistics” below, provides information about the 10 experimental groups. 
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Participants 
Table 1: Participants statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Number of shares owned 
at the end 
10 12.711 0 56 
Final cash 15216.87 8814.567 40 43132 
Total dividends received 3572.289 2783.718 300 12300 
Final rank payment 22.554 5.02 12 30 
n=83    
 
Excluding 6 participants that were not willing to disclose their age, participant ages ranged 
between 18 to 61 (mean = 26.441, SD = 9.108). 58 participants (69.88%) were under the age of 
30. 
Table 2: Participants age (excluding undisclosed) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
Age 26.441 9.108 18 61 
n=77 
53 participants (63.85%) were females and 30 participants identified themselves as male or 
‘other gender’. Participants earned on average 22.55 AUD (SD = 5.02). Males and ‘other gender’ 
participants earned (mean = 23.133, SD = 5.218) slightly more than females (mean = 22.226, SD 
= 4.925). 
A flat fee of 30 AUD (270 AUD in total) was paid to each pilot group participant. This was done 
to compensate participants for additional participation time, as they were asked to provide 
supplementary feedback after the experiment. All the experiment participants received a flat 
showup fee of 10 AUD (830 AUD in total) as well as 2 – 20 AUD performance fee (1042 AUD 
in total) for taking part in this study. Total expenses for this study were 2142 AUD. 
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4.2 Bubble Measures 
   
Table 3: Treatment Summary, lists summary statistics of the different experimental groups in this 
study. The table lists the group numbers, treatment types, how many participants took part, as 
well as the minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation of the contract prices traded by 
each group. Based on the methodology the was used in this study, the intrinsic value was limited 
to a maximum of 1000E$ (a dividend of 50E$ x 15 periods + buyout value of 250E$) and a 
minimum of 50E$ (a dividend of 0E$ x 15 periods + buyout value of 50E$). Nevertheless, group 
#1, a baseline group, trading patterns recorded 8 periods where the mean values were above the 
maximum possible intrinsic value, with one period mean value recorded as high as 2780E$. The 
lowest recorded period mean was 54.8E$. Therefore, no group recorded a period with mean 
value below the minimum possible intrinsic value. There were, however, recordings of single 
transactions below this value in the baseline groups. Group size did not significantly affect the 
mean price in the baseline groups or the nudge treatment groups. Standard deviation was higher 
in the baseline groups compared to the general nudge groups, which in turn mostly recorded 
higher values compared to the specific nudge groups. 
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Table 3: Treatments Summary 
Group Treatment Type Number of 
Participants 
Minimum 
Contract 
Price 
Maximum 
Contract 
Price 
Mean 
Contract 
Price 
Standard 
Deviation 
Price 
1 Baseline 8 1 5000 1191.796 452.173 
2 Baseline 8 1 700 171.126 90.567 
7 Baseline 9 20 700 332.642 41.843 
8 Baseline 9 5 1000 611.354 124.893 
3 General Nudge 9 150 850 425.533 37.214 
5 General Nudge 7 180 800 400.900 44.256 
9 General Nudge 9 250 800 469.692 39.699 
4 Specific Nudge 8 150 600 396.636 40.948 
6 Specific Nudge 6 145 600 350.284 22.439 
10 Specific Nudge 10 300 750 495.976 20.126 
 
 
In order to compare the baseline groups to the nudge groups, three stock market bubble measures 
were used. These measures also allowed comparison to previous notable studies by (Porter and 
Smith 1995; Smith et al. 1988; Van Boening et al. 1993) which used the same methodology as 
the baseline groups. These data are reported in “Table 4: Treatments Summary – Bubble 
Measures”. 
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Table 4: Treatments Summary – Bubble Measures 
Group Treatment 
Type 
Amplitude Normalised 
Absolute 
Deviation 
Turnover 
1 Baseline 4.409 19.337 2.35 
2 Baseline 0.428 11.312 4.662 
7 Baseline 1.22 9.101 3.7 
8 Baseline 0.749 11.806 4.022 
3 General Nudge 0.445 5.147 5.356 
5 General Nudge 0.294 2.611 2.714 
9 General Nudge 0.300 1.991 1.644 
4 Specific Nudge 0.348 0.512 1.1 
6 Specific Nudge 0.216 0.649 1.85 
10 Specific Nudge 0.279 3.974 2.68 
Smith, Suchanek, and 
Williams (1988) 
Baseline 1.24 5.68 4.55 
Van Boening, 
Williams, and Le 
Master (1993) 
Baseline 4.19 5.12 5.05 
Porter and Smith 
(1995) 
Baseline 1.53  5.49 
 
The figures presented in table 4: Treatments Summary – Bubble Measures, show that the 
baseline groups in this experiment yielded similar results to previous studies for Amplitude and 
Turnover, and higher results for Normalised Absolute Deviation. Amplitude ranged between 
0.428 - 4.409 compared to 1.24 - 4.19 and Turnover ranged between 2.35 - 4.662 compared to 
4.55 - 5.49. Notably, the Normalised Absolute Deviation in this experiment’s baseline groups 
ranged between 9.101 - 19.337 compared to 5.12 - 5.68. This may suggest that participants in 
this experiment baseline groups are less experienced and/or less financially savvy compared to 
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participants from previous experiments, therefore trading the asset more volatility, further away 
from the intrinsic value.   
 
Nudge treatments yielded lower values compared to this study and previous studies’ baseline 
groups. Amplitude ranged between 0.294 - 0.445 in the general nudge treatment groups and 
between 0.216 - 0.348 in the specific nudge treatment groups. Both represent a considerable 
difference from the baseline groups. Low values of amplitude show that the price changes are 
relatively close to the asset intrinsic value, alluding that prices have not diverged from the asset 
intrinsic value (Noussair, C and Tucker 2006). Normalised Absolute Deviation ranged between 
1.991 - 5.147 in the general nudge treatment groups and between 0.512 - 3.974 in the specific 
nudge treatment groups. Again, these differences represent a considerable difference from the 
baseline groups. Low Normalized Absolute Deviation suggests that a high proportion of the 
trading was done closer to the intrinsic value (Noussair, C and Tucker 2006). Turnover ranged 
between 1.644 - 5.356 in the general nudge treatment groups and between 1.1 - 2.68 in the 
specific nudge treatment groups. In this case, while baseline groups recorded higher values 
compared to the specific nudge groups, the general nudge groups showed varying turnover 
values which were not identified as different from the baseline groups. Additionally, it appears 
that group sizes did not affect the turnover rate. 
 
To statistically test the null hypotheses and the related sub hypotheses, and due to the non-
normal distribution of data, Mann-Whitney U test was selected to compare the above measures. 
The results are presented in “5 Table 5: Mann-Whitney U Test comparing Bubble Measures by 
Treatment Types“ below. Analyses of these data, suggest that both the general nudge and the 
specific nudge treatments have significant difference (p = 0.077 and p = 0.034 respectively) in 
Price Amplitude measures compared to the baseline group, therefore supporting hypotheses 1.1 
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and 2.1. The Normalised Absolute Deviation measure statistics also significantly (p = 0.034 and 
p = 0.034) suggest that, the nudge treatment groups behave differently compared to the baseline 
groups, therefore supporting hypotheses 1.2 and 2.2. Analysis of the Turnover measure shows 
that a significant difference (p = 0.077) exists between the baseline groups and the specific nudge 
treatments, therefore confirming hypothesis 2.3. The lack of significant difference between the 
baseline and the general nudge treatments may be attributed to the single general nudge group 
with higher (5.36) Turnover rate. Overall, it appears that the three bubble measures are lower in 
the nudge groups, and that the differences between the baseline groups and the nudge groups are 
mostly significant. This suggests that Null hypothesis 1 can be partially rejected, and Null 
hypothesis 2 can be fully rejected. It can be also concluded that the general nudge is effective 
with some limitations, and the specific nudge is completely effective in mitigating bubbles. 
 
It is important to note that while “Table 4: Treatments Summary – Bubble Measures” above 
shows value difference between the general nudge and specific nudge groups in bubble measures 
indicators, an additional Mann-Whitney U test comparing the two different nudge groups 
measurements did not yield significant differences. This information was removed from Table 5 
below. 
Table 5: Mann-Whitney U Test comparing Bubble Measures by Treatment Types 
Treatment types 
compared 
Variable compared Hypothesis p value 
Baseline vs. General Nudge Price Amplitude 1.1 0.077* 
Baseline vs. Specific Nudge Price Amplitude 2.1 0.034** 
Baseline vs. General Nudge Normalised Absolute Deviation 1.2 0.034** 
Baseline vs. Specific Nudge Normalised Absolute Deviation 2.2 0.034** 
Baseline vs. General Nudge Turnover 1.3 0.724 
Baseline vs. Specific Nudge Turnover 2.3 0.077* 
         * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
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4.3 Offers and Contracts 
In a continuous double auction setting, a contract can only be made if there are two matching buy 
and sell offers. Therefore, two different participants must first submit buy and sell offers, and 
these in turn, are matched by the trading system. The system then creates and finalises the 
contract while adjusting both participants’ assets. The following section presents and analyses 
offer and contract activities across all 10 group experiments. 
Offers 
Figure 2: Offers Means 
 
The offer patterns observed from the experimental groups are summarised in “Figure 2: Offers 
Means” above. This figure distinguishes between different experimental groups by averaging 
their period means. There are several identifiable differences between the baseline and the nudge 
treatment groups offer patterns: 
(1) on average, participants in the general groups tend to start the trading below the intrinsic 
value. However, after 3-4 periods of trading, the market peaks and remains at that level, with 
some fluctuation, until period 13. One possible explanation is that participants’ expectations are 
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more realistic at later periods. They realise that the market value is extremely detached from the 
maximum dividend stream and the buyout value and stop speculating (Smith et al. 1988), thus 
selling their assets at prices that are closer to or below the intrinsic value.  
(2) on average, participants in the nudge groups do not deviate significantly from the intrinsic 
value in the initial periods. Participants maintain a reasonable proximity to the intrinsic value 
line for about 4 - 7 periods. At this point, the trading pattern changes and participants are willing 
to pay about 20 percent more than the intrinsic value. This remains constant until the final period. 
A possible explanation can be that nudges have a limited time effect, and that after several 
periods, some of the participants are no longer responding to the nudge. 
Figure 3: Offers-Participants Ratio 
 
Offers-Participants Ratio = 
Number of Offers in Period
Number of treatment Participants
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Offers-Participants ratio is used to normalise the differences between the treatment group sizes, 
and to accurately compare between the amount of offers each treatment type group has made. 
Offers-Participants ratio is the ratio between the total number of treatment participants and the 
number of offers (either buy or sell offers) in a given period. In general, the number of offers is 
at least twice as much as the number of contracts as two offers are required to complete each 
contract. Offers can also be cancelled due to participants’ choices, or as a result of a system 
cancellation due to end of period for unmatched offers. From the “Figure 3: Offers-Participants 
Ratio” above, it can be concluded that: (1) On average, all groups start with a high Offer-
Participant ratio and decline thereafter. The specific nudge groups are first to stabilise at period 4. 
The general nudge groups stabilise at period 5. The baseline groups stabilise at period 9. (2) 
Baseline groups Offer-Participant ratio is nearly twice as much at the first periods compared to 
the last periods. This can be attributed to fact that the turnover rate is much higher during bubble 
formations and is comparably lower during the burst phase (Smith et al. 1988).  
One of the general nudge treatment groups yielded an interesting phenomenon. In this group, a 
participant decided to avoid trading throughout the experiment, thus relying on dividend 
payments only. The participant’s risk profile has been identified as risk neutral, with a lack of 
equity, derivatives or other investment products trading experience. Therefore, it is likely that the 
participant, being risk neutral, and with no thorough understanding of the market, decided that 
the best approach would be not to participate at all.  
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Contracts 
 
Figure 4: Contracts Means 
 
The contract completion patterns observed from the experimental groups are summarised in 
“Figure 4: Contracts Means”. This figure presents different experimental groups by averaging 
their period means. There are several identifiable differences between the baseline groups and 
the nudge treatment groups contract patterns: (1) on average, participants in the baseline groups 
tend to start trading below the intrinsic value. However, after 3-4 periods of trading the market 
peaks and remains at that level, with some fluctuation, until period 13 where it declines rapidly. 
This behaviour follows the bubble and burst pattern demonstrated in previous studies (Porter and 
Smith 2003; Smith et al. 1988; Smith et al. 2000). (2) On average, participants in the nudge 
groups do not significantly deviate from the intrinsic value in the initial periods. Participants 
maintain a reasonable proximity to the intrinsic value line for about 7 periods. At this point, the 
trading pattern changes, and participants are willing to pay about 50 percent more than the 
intrinsic value. This remains constant until the final period. (3) On average, treatments do not 
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converge to or trade below the intrinsic value at the last period. This is an unusual behaviour 
compared to previous studies (Porter and Smith 2003; Smith et al. 1988; Smith et al. 2000). 
Notably, there were individual groups that did converge or traded closely to intrinsic value at the 
final periods. 
Figure 5: Contracts-Participants Ratio 
 
Contracts-Participants Ratio = 
Number of Contracts in Period
Number of treatment Participants
 
Contracts-Participants ratio is used in order to normalise the differences between the treatment 
group sizes, and to accurately compare between the amount of contracts each treatment type 
groups have made. Contracts-Participants is the ratio between the total number of treatment 
participants and the number of contracts (one contract represents a matched buy and sell offers) 
in a given period.  
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From “Figure 5: Contracts-Participants Ratio” above, it can be concluded that: (1) On average, 
the baseline and the general nudge groups start with a high Contracts-Participants ratio and 
decline thereafter. The specific nudge groups start much lower than the other experimental 
groups and form a stabilised pattern from period 3. The baseline and general nudge groups only 
stabilise around periods 8 - 9. (2) Both the baseline and the general nudge groups’ Contracts-
Participants ratio is nearly twice as much at the first periods compared to the last periods. This 
reinforces the analysis findings that turnover rate is much higher during bubble formations and 
comparably significantly lower during the burst phase. 
Figure 6: Offers-Contracts Ratio 
 
Offers-Contracts Ratio = 
Number of Contracts in Period
Number of Offers in Period
 
 
The Offers-Contracts ratio is used to identify offers to contracts conversion patterns between the 
different treatment types. Offers-Contracts ratio is the ratio between the total number of contracts 
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and the amount of offers in a given period. From the graph above, it can be concluded that: (1) 
On average, the baseline and the general nudge groups start with a high Offers-Contracts ratio 
and decline thereafter. The specific nudge groups’ Offers-Contracts ratio start much lower than 
the other groups, and form a stabilised pattern from period 4 until period 10. The baseline and 
general nudge groups merely stabilise around period 9. (2) Both baseline and general nudge 
groups Offers-Contracts ratio is about 50 percent more in the first periods compared to the last 
periods. This reinforces the offer and contract analysis findings about turnover rate for those 
treatments. The specific nudge groups behaviour may imply that specific nudging can also 
significantly reduce matched offers execution (contracts) as outlined in table 6 below. 
Table 6: Executed offers by Treatment Type 
Executed 
Offer 
Baseline General 
Nudge 
Specific 
Nudge 
Total Total % 
No 1443 965 1446 3854 41.73 
Yes 2668 1726 988 5382 58.27 
Summary 4111 2691 2434 9236  
 Pearson chi2(2) = 425.2620   Pr = 0.000 
 
In cases where the nudge trigger threshold was not met, and no nudge was presented, or in other 
cases where participants decided to ignore the nudge, participants’ offers were placed in the 
order book. At this stage, participants could still make a decision to cancel their offers, using a 
dedicated button in the trading screen. Offers that were cancelled by this method, could not be 
attributed to the nudge statistics as participants were not nudged to cancel their offers once they 
were placed in the order book. Therefore, it is very likely that order book offers were cancelled 
due to changes in market prices or due to the participants’ change of mind. 
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Table 7: Cancelled order book offers by Treatment Type 
Cancelled 
Offer 
Baseline General 
Nudge 
Specific 
Nudge 
Total Total % 
No 3985 2567 2304 8856 95.89 
Yes 126 124 130 380 4.11 
Summary 4111 2691 2434 9236  
Pearson chi2(2) = 22.4211   Pr = 0.000 
 
Another aspect that was investigated is contract initiator by treatment type. Looking at the data in 
“Table 8: Contract initiator by Treatment Type” below, it is apparent that more contracts are 
initiated by sellers across all treatments. This behaviour may be attributed to the “Disposition 
Effect” where investors sell wining stocks before selling losing stocks (Shefrin and Statman 
1985). More specifically in the context of this experiment, participants are trying to make a quick 
profit, selling their winning assets. 
Table 8: Contract initiator by Treatment Type 
Initiated by 
buyer 
Baseline General 
Nudge 
Specific 
Nudge 
Total Total % 
No 758 538 299 1595 62.72 
Yes 498 282 168 948 37.28 
Summary 1256 820 467 2543  
Pearson chi2(2) =   6.2855   Pr = 0.043 
 
This phenomenon did not seem to vary between periods, as demonstrated by the data in table 9: 
“Contract initiator by Period”. 
Table 9: Contract initiator by Period 
Initiated by 
buyer 
1  2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 Total 
No 165 161 115 131 112 97 109 93 85 77 89 84 101 85 91 1,595 
Yes 95 126 103 75 75 66 58 43 48 47 46 52 22 52 40 948 
Summary 260 287 218 206 187 163 167 136 133 124 135 136 123 137 131 2,543 
Pearson chi2(14) =   41.5715   Pr = 0.000 
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4.4 Treatments 
A total of 10 groups participated in this experiment. The following section provides graphical 
and textual information about the trading patterns of each group, during the trading periods of the 
experiment. The graphs in the following page contain 3 indicators. Blue lines reflect the mean 
price for each period. Red lines represent the intrinsic value of the asset in each period. Bars 
represent the number of executed matched offers (contracts). 
Baseline (contracts) 
  
Four baseline group experiments were performed, compared to three groups in each nudge 
treatment. The additional baseline group was added due to an unusual behaviour in baseline 
group 2. The group participants traded the assets below the intrinsic value at all times. This 
formed a ‘negative bubble’ as depicted in “Figure 8: Baseline Groups – Group 2“ below. This 
unusual pattern required an addition of another group in order to verify whether this group 
behaviour was unusual. Comparing the additional group and the other two groups’ statistics, 
confirmed that the trading patterns of group two were unusual. Nevertheless, the decisions 
recorded from this group were included in the overall statistics. All baseline groups traded away 
from the intrinsic value compared to the nudge treatment groups. 
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Figure 7: Baseline Groups - Group 1 
 
Figure 8: Baseline Groups - Group 2 
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Figure 9: Baseline Groups - Group 7 
 
Figure 10: Baseline Groups - Group 8 
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Group No. 1 turnover was medium-low during the first 3 periods. During these periods the 
trading formed a bubble where it peaked at 2780 E$. A lower turnover was accompanied by a 
sharp drop in price until period 6. Overall, the turnover increased with a steady decline in the 
asset trading value. Noticeable turnover rates were observed during periods 11, 13 and 14 which 
contributed to additional decline in price until it converged to and dropped below the intrinsic 
value in period 15 after nearly 400 E$ value loss in that period. While this price pattern matches 
previous studies, the turnover seems to be contradictory to previous studies that have shown 
rising turnover during bubble formation and declining turnover during the burst phase (Smith et 
al. 1988). 
Group No. 2 turnover was relatively high for the first 6 periods. This pattern was accompanied 
by declining lower mean contract prices compared to the intrinsic value which formed a 
‘negative bubble’. From period 7, the turnover rate gradually declined until the last trading 
period. The lower than intrinsic value mean contract pattern was kept until the final period. The 
mean risk profile of the participants (excluding 1 participant with inconsistent risk profile) was 
4.714 which is above the average, that is, more risk seeking. The results do not align with risk-
taking behaviour that is associated with bubble formation. Similar trading patterns were observed 
in previous experiments that provided participants with price information (Huber and Kirchler 
2011).  
 Group No. 7 turnover was medium during all periods, except period 2, which had extremely 
high turnover comparably. The trading pattern was somewhat unusual, as assets were traded 
below the intrinsic value line in the first part, and above it, in the second part of the experiment. 
Nevertheless, from period 6 until the final period, the trading formed bubble and burst pattern. 
The observed behaviour of this group follows previous studies pattern, where trading starts 
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below the intrinsic value line, rises above it, only to drop back to it or below towards the end 
(Porter and Smith 2003; Smith et al. 1988; Smith et al. 2000). 
Group No. 8 turnover was extremely high during the first 2 periods. During these periods the 
trading seemed to slightly deviate from the intrinsic value. From period 3, alongside a turnover 
decline, the mean contract price increased, and formed a noticeable deviation of about 200 
E$ from the intrinsic value. This pattern remained until the conclusion of trading. Noticeably, 
from this period on, the asset price kept significant distance from the intrinsic value, and did not 
drop relatively to the intrinsic value asset decline.  
General nudge (contracts) 
Three general nudge treatment group experiments were carried. During those treatments, on each 
occasion where the proposed price, and the real (intrinsic) value differed by more than 5 percent, 
the participants were alerted. In cases where the proposed contract was a buy contract (BID), the 
participants were alerted with the following message: “You are offering a price that is higher 
than the real value of this asset. Are you sure you want to buy at this price?”, In cases where the 
proposed contract was a sell contract (ASK), the participants were alerted with the following 
message: “You are offering a price that is lower than the real value of this asset. Are you sure 
you want to sell at this price?”. All general nudge treatment groups traded closer to the intrinsic 
value line compared to the baseline groups. 
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Figure 11: General Nudge Groups - Group 3 
 
Figure 12: General Nudge Groups - Group 5 
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Figure 13: General Nudge Groups - Group 9 
 
Group No. 3 turnover was very high in the first period. The turnover rate fluctuated until period 
8 where it dropped to its’ lowest level for this group. During the first 8 periods, trading nearly 
converged to the intrinsic value line at all times. However, from this period on, the trading 
pattern significantly changed, and contracts were completed above the intrinsic value line, until 
the conclusion of the experiment. A possible explanation for this behaviour could be that the 
nudge applied may have a limited time effect. 
Group No. 5 turnover was relatively high for the first 4 periods. This pattern was accompanied 
by fluctuating, yet close to convergence to the intrinsic value contract prices. From period 5, the 
turnover rate sharply declined until the last trading period. This was accompanied by a rise in 
price in periods 5 – 7, and a steady drop until period 11, where trading price dropped below the 
intrinsic value line. During periods 11 – 15, the deviation from the intrinsic value line was kept 
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to a minimum. This may suggest that the participants comprehended the asset intrinsic value by 
period 11 and adjusted their trading accordingly.   
Group No. 9 turnover was relatively high for the first 4 periods. This pattern was accompanied 
by a rise in the asset trading price to a difference of about 150 - 175 E$ from the intrinsic value 
line, which was kept until period 9. With a lower turnover, the price dropped in periods 10 and 
11, only to fluctuate in conjunction with a higher turnover until the conclusion of trading. While 
the effects of the nudge in this group are less conclusive, it is still possible that the stable trading 
pattern can be attributed to the nudge applied to this group.  
 
Specific nudge (contracts) 
Three specific nudge treatment group experiments were carried out. During these treatments, on 
each occasion where the proposed price and the real (intrinsic) value differed by more than five 
percent, the participants were alerted. In cases where the proposed contract was a buy contract 
(BID), the participants were alerted with the following message: “You are offering a price that is 
higher by xxE$ and is increased by xx.xx% of the real value of this asset. Are you sure you want 
to buy at this price?”, In cases where the proposed contract was a sell contract (ASK), the 
participants were alerted with the following message: “You are offering a price that is lower by 
xxE$ and is decreased by xx.xx% of the real value of this asset. Are you sure you want to sell at 
this price?”. All specific nudge treatment groups traded closer to the intrinsic value line 
compared to the baseline groups. 
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Figure 14: Specific Nudge Groups - Group 4 
 
Figure 15: Specific Nudge Groups - Group 6 
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Figure 16: Specific Nudge Groups - Group 10 
 
Group No. 4 turnover was high in the first 2 periods. The turnover rate dropped and fluctuated 
until period 13 where it dropped to its’ lowest level for this group (no trade). During the first 8 
periods, trading fluctuated around the intrinsic value line. However, during periods 9 and 10 the 
price rose to about E$ 130 above the intrinsic value line. From period 11 and on, the prices 
dropped back until the final period where it nearly converged with the intrinsic value line. The 
sudden rise in price during periods 9 and 10 may be explained by a limited time effect of the 
applied nudge. 
Group No. 6 turnover was low for most of the experiment periods, with an extremely low 
turnover rate of 3 during periods 12, 13 and 15. The group maintained near convergence trading 
pattern throughout the experiment. This behaviour is a perfect example of the behaviour 
expected from the specific nudge effect. 
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Group No. 10 turnover was medium for the first 2 periods with a constant distance of about 
E$ 60 from the intrinsic value line. In period 3, the turnover dropped, and the deviation from the 
intrinsic value line rose to about 170 E$. This deviation kept with varying trading values of 
E$ 95 – 204 until the conclusion of trading. While the nudge effects in this group may not be 
conclusive, it is possible that the stable trading pattern shown compared to non-nudged groups, 
was due to the applied nudge. 
4.5 Risk 
Supported by previous studies (Dohmen et al. 2011) linking hypothetical risk choices and real 
risk tendency, participants were asked a series of seven questions in an ascending order of risk 
taking. In each question, the participants were presented with a hypothetical scenario that had no 
actual monetary incentives, and were asked to choose between two options: a certain (sure) 
option, and a risky option. The participants’ risk profile was then calculated and set to a value 
between 1, risk averse, and 7, risk seeking. In order to calculate the risk profile for each 
participant, Hsee and Weber (1999) method was used: in cases where the participant chose the 
sure option in all 7 questions, the risk profile was set as 1. In cases where the participant chose 
the risky option in all 7 questions, the risk profile was set as 7. If a participant started choosing 
the risky options, and later changed the preference to the sure options, the participant was given a 
risk profile mark equal to the index of the question where the change in preference was made. 
For example: if a participant chose the risky option in questions 1-3, and then chose the sure 
option in question 4, the participant’s risk profile was set as 4. In cases where the participant 
answers were inconsistent, for example: if the participant choose the risky option in question 1, 
then chose the safe option in question 2, and then chose the risky option in question 3, the 
participant risk profile was flagged as undefined risk profile.  
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“Table 10: Risk Profile Choices by Gender” below shows the questions asked, and the 
corresponding participants’ choices for each option in the risk profile questions. The answers are 
grouped by gender. Female participants, the majority in this study, tended to prefer the safer 
options, compared to males and ‘other gender’, for all questions except for the last one. 
Table 10: Risk Profile Choices by Gender 
Question Options Male and  
‘other gender’ 
Female 
1 Safe - Savings: receive exactly 2% 
Risky - Stock: receive either 0% or 
10% with equal probabilities 
Safe: 2 = 6.67% 
Risky: 28 = 93.33% 
Safe: 5 = 9.43% 
Risky: 48 = 90.57% 
2 Safe - Savings: receive exactly 3% 
Risky - Stock: receive either 0% or 
10% with equal probabilities 
Safe: 3 = 10% 
Risky: 27 = 90% 
Safe: 10 = 18.87% 
Risky: 43 = 81.13% 
3 Safe - Savings: receive exactly 4% 
Risky - Stock: receive either 0% or 
10% with equal probabilities 
Safe: 5 = 16.67% 
Risky: 25 = 83.33% 
Safe: 20 = 37.74% 
Risky: 33 = 62.26% 
4 Safe - Savings: receive exactly 5% 
Risky - Stock: receive either 0% or 
10% with equal probabilities 
Safe: 18 = 60% 
Risky: 12 = 40% 
Safe: 33 = 62.26% 
Risky: 20 = 37.74% 
5 Safe - Savings: receive exactly 6% 
Risky - Stock: receive either 0% or 
10% with equal probabilities 
Safe: 21 = 70% 
Risky: 9 = 30% 
Safe: 45 = 84.91% 
Risky: 8 = 15.09% 
6 Safe - Savings: receive exactly 7% 
Risky - Stock: receive either 0% or 
10% with equal probabilities 
Safe: 22 = 73.33% 
Risky: 8 = 26.67% 
Safe: 48 = 90.57% 
Risky: 5 = 9.43% 
7 Safe - Savings: receive exactly 8% 
Risky - Stock: receive either 0% or 
10% with equal probabilities 
Safe: 28 = 93.33% 
Risky: 2 = 6.67% 
Safe: 46 = 86.79% 
Risky: 7 = 13.21% 
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The average risk profile was 4.338. Males and ‘other gender’ had slightly higher risk profile 
(mean = 4.393, SD = 1.640) than females (mean = 4.304, SD = 1.380). In general, the 
participants’ risk profile suggested that they were leaning somewhat towards a riskier behaviour. 
“Table 11: Risk Profile for all participants” below shows the risk profile for each gender. 
Table 11: Risk Profile for all participants (excluding inconsistencies) 
Gender Observations Mean Standard 
Deviation 
Min Max 
Male and ‘other gender’ 28 4.393 1.640 1 7 
Female 46 4.304     1.380           1 7 
Summary 74 4.342      1 7 
 
“Table 12: Offers by Risk Profile and Treatment type” below shows that in the baseline groups, 
participants identified as having neutral (4) to slightly risky (5) profile, submitted most of the 
offers. In the general and specific nudge groups, neutral risk profile (4) participants, submitted 
significantly more offers than any other risk profiles. This information is fairly aligned with the 
distribution of the risk profile. For example, participants who were identified with a neutral risk 
profile (39.19%) account for 36.75% of the orders placed. 
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Table 12: Offers by Risk Profile and Treatment type 
Risk Profile Baseline General 
Nudge 
Specific 
Nudge 
Total Total % 
Undefined 326 108 429 863 9.34 
1 – No risk 169 125 0 294 3.18 
2 95 15 320 430 4.65 
3 261 279 351 891 9.65 
4 – Neutral 1291 1497 606 3394 36.75 
5 1485 252 352 2089 22.62 
6 268 0 189 457 4.95 
7 – Max Risk 216 415 187 818 8.86 
Summary 4111 2691 2434 9236  
Pearson chi2(14) = 2.4e+03   Pr = 0.000 
 
4.6 Ancestry and Language 
Participants were local and international students. Significant portion of the participants were 
from different ancestries, and spoke languages other than English as their first language. This 
allowed to investigate whether differences between origins and languages have any influence on 
the participants’ decisions throughout the experiment.  
Ancestry 
To infer whether participants’ ancestry had any impact on their trading patterns, participants 
were asked to specify their ancestry from the following options available: 1. English, 2. Irish, 3. 
Italian, 4. German, 5. Chinese, 6. Scottish, 7. Australian, 8. Other - please specify (participants 
were able to fill in a free text box). The options selected for this study were based on the 
Australian census questionnaire options. Analysis of the data suggests that 26 out of the 83 
participants were of Chinese ancestry, 7 were of English ancestry, and the other participants 
represented a variety of ancestries, consisting of 9 Vietnamese, 9 Indian and other origins. 16 of 
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the ‘other’ ancestries declared that they spoke English as their first language at home. There were 
no Italian, German or Scottish participants in any of the groups, therefore, those were excluded 
from the summary table below. 
Table 13: Ancestry by Treatment Type 
Ancestry Baseline General Nudge Specific Nudge Total 
English 4 3 0 7 
Irish 1 2 0 3 
Chinese 7 8 11 26 
Australian 2 0 1 3 
Other -Vietnamese 3 3 3 9 
Other – Indian 4 1 4 9 
Other – Sri Lankan 1 0 1 2 
Other - Various 12 8 4 24 
Summary 34 25 24 83 
 
An additional interesting aspect is the cancellation of offers, prior to their entry to the order book, 
by ancestry. Cancellation of those offers could only be performed in the nudge treatments. 
Therefore, the statistics below only represents these treatments. Analysing the cancellation rate 
of the offers revealed that, participants of Irish, Australian, and Sri-Lankan ancestry, had 
significantly higher cancelation rate compared to other participants. As the number of 
participants representing these ancestries is significantly low, it is reasonable to argue that this 
can be attributed to the participants’ individual behaviour rather to their ancestry. The table 
below shows the cancelled offers by ancestry. 
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Table 14: Cancelled Offers by Ancestry 
Ancestry Not Cancelled Cancelled Cancel Percent Total 
English 214 15 6.5% 229 
Irish 54 34 38.6% 88 
Chinese 2283 229 9.1% 2512 
Australian 21 18 46.1% 39 
Other -Vietnamese 396 35 8.1% 431 
Other - Indian 316 53 14.3% 369 
Other – Sri Lankan 46 156 77.2% 202 
Other - Various 1166 89 7% 1255 
Summary 4496 629 12.3% 5125 
Pearson chi2(6) = 164.9217   Pr = 0.000 
  
Language 
In order to infer whether the participants first spoken language had any impact on their trading 
patterns, participants were asked whether they speak a different language than English at home, 
from the following options: 1. No, English only, 2. Yes, Italian, 3. Yes, Greek, 4. Yes, 
Cantonese, 5. Yes, Arabic, 6. Yes, Mandarin, 7. Yes, Vietnamese, 8. Yes, other – please specify 
(participants were able to fill in a free text box). Options were based on the Australian census 
questionnaire. Analysis of the data suggests that 27 out of the 83 participants spoke English as 
their first language, 17 spoke Mandarin and the rest represented a variety of languages, including 
27 who had chosen option number 8 (other) as their language at home.  There were no Italian or 
Greek speaking participants in any of the groups, therefore, these languages were excluded from 
the summary table below. 
 
 
 
 65 
 
Table 15: Language at Home by Treatment Type 
Ancestry Baseline General Nudge Specific Nudge Total 
English 12 8 7 27 
Cantonese 0 2 1 3 
Arabic 0 0 1 1 
Mandarin 6 3 8 17 
Vietnamese 3 3 2 8 
Other – Indian 
origin languages 
3 1 3 7 
Other – Indonesian 
origin languages 
1 1 2 4 
Other - Various 9 7 0 16 
Summary 34 25 24 83 
 
Interpretation of the results from “Table 16: Cancelled Offers by Language at Home” suggests 
that English speaking participants decided to cancel significantly more offers than any other 
group. A possible explanation is that English speaking participants are more likely to understand 
the nudge message, which is conveyed in English compared to participants who do not speak 
English as their first language, and therefore act according to the nudge suggestion. This is also 
supported by previous studies showing that messages in foreign languages, even when 
understood, increase the participant’s cognitive load, which in turn, triggers systematic 
processing, decreasing the influence of these messages (Keysar et al. 2012). Therefore, in this 
study context, reducing the impact of nudges. “Table 16: Cancelled Offers by Language at Home” 
below shows the effect of language spoken at home on offer cancelation. 
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Table 16: Cancelled Offers by Language at Home 
Language at 
Home 
Not Cancelled Cancelled Cancel Percent Total 
English 1413 304 17.7% 1717 
Cantonese 261 14 5.1% 275 
Arabic 118 50 29.8% 168 
Mandarin 1199 136 10.2% 1335 
Vietnamese 274 30 9.9% 304 
Other – Indian 
origin languages 
273 38 12.2% 311 
Other – Indonesian 
origin languages 
272 35 11.4% 307 
Other - Various 686 22 3.1% 708 
Summary 4496 629 12.3% 5125 
Pearson chi2(7) = 170.4460   Pr = 0.000 
 
4.7 Age 
Participants were assigned to different age groups in 5 year intervals, as per the Australian 
Bureau of Statistics demographic classification (ABS 2017). The following categories were used:  
Undisclosed, 18-19 (instead of 15-19), 20-24, 25-29, 30-34, 35-39, 40+. Analysis of the 
information in “Table 16: Offers by Age Group per Treatment Type” below, reveals that some 
age groups (for example: undisclosed, 25-29), produce less offers relative to their representation 
in the population, while other age groups (for example: 18-19, 20-24) produce more offers 
relative to their representation. High offer rate and increased trading participation may be 
attributed to higher risk taking tendency in younger age groups (Dohmen et al. 2011). 
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Table 17: Offers by Age Group per Treatment Type 
Age Group Number of 
Participants 
Percent 
of Total 
Baseline General 
Nudge 
Specific 
Nudge 
Total 
Offers 
Percent 
of Total 
Undisclosed 6 7.23% 346 56 88 490 5.31% 
18-19 8 9.64% 280 326 442 1048 11.35% 
20-24 39 46.99% 2084 1247 1105 4436 48.03% 
25-29 11 13.25% 558 309 207 1074 11.63% 
30-34 10 12.05% 322 634 233 1189 12.87% 
35-39 2 2.41% 210 0 0 210 2.27% 
40+ 7 8.43% 311 119 359 789 8.54% 
Summary 83  4111 2691 2434 9236  
Pearson chi2(12) = 1.1e+03   Pr = 0.000 
 
4.8 Equity trading experience 
Out of the 83 participants, only 10 participants, or 12 percent of the population, confirmed that 
they had previous equity experience. Three of those were ranked first in their groups, three were 
ranked second, and the rest were ranked as third, fourth and fifth. However, Pearson chi2 
analysis of the relationship between equity experience and the participants’ final ranking 
returned insignificant results (p = 0.257). Analysis of the general and specific nudge groups’ 
offer cancellation by equity trading experience, revealed that experienced participants cancelled 
significantly less offers, relatively to their population proportion. It is possible that these 
participants may have been more aware of the intrinsic value and perhaps more confident of their 
choices, and therefore, decided to ignore the nudges in some cases. 
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Table 18: Cancelled offers by Equity trading experience 
Cancelled 
Offer 
Inexperienced Experienced Total 
No 3637 
(80.89%) 
859 
(19.11%) 
4496 
Yes 576 
(91.57%) 
53 
(8.43%) 
629 
Summary 4213 912 5125 
     Pearson chi2(1) = 43.024   Pr = 0.000 
 
4.9 Nudging and Value Certainty 
Porter and Smith (1995) suggest that providing participants with information about the intrinsic 
value of an asset, may not be sufficient to induce rational behaviour during trading. In this study, 
all participants were provided with a table containing the estimated values of the asset 
throughout the experiment. This information was provided at the start of the experiment in the 
form of a handout. Participants were also able to access the same data via an “instructions” 
button available on the trading screen. Therefore, all participants were able to make choices 
under value certainty conditions. The results allude that, while all participants in the baseline 
groups could use the values table provided, they mostly overlooked this option or decided to 
follow the market, and ignore the data provided. It is important to note that from observations of 
the participants’ behaviour during the experiment, it appeared that some participants did use the 
values table provided during the trading periods. As this was not the focus of this thesis, no use 
of the values table by the participants has been recorded. This could be considered as an 
improvement for future research. 
Rational behaviour can be achieved, however, with experience (Porter and Smith 1995).  In the 
general and specific nudge groups, participants received the same asset value data as in the 
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baseline groups. However, participants were also provided with relevant nudges as reminders to 
the real value of the asset traded each time they submitted an offer. While a similar behaviour 
was observed, that is, the values table has been underutilised, the nudging ensured that 
participants were provided with an active reminder of the value, therefore, able to gain asset 
valuation understanding faster, as well as reinforcing their value certainty throughout the 
experiment. Moreover, it is possible that this also supported faster experience advancement, as 
knowing what the asset value is, and how other participants trade it, may improve overall market 
behaviour comprehension. 
The statistics in “Table 19: Cancelled Offers by Treatment Type” through to “Table 23: 
Cancelled Offers by Final Rank” below, refer to offers that were cancelled by the participants 
after nudging, thus before they were placed in the order book. It was not possible to cancel offers 
before they were placed in the order book during the baseline group experiments. In both nudge 
treatments, in cases where the intrinsic value was higher for buy offers or lower for sell offers, 
by more than 5 percent compared to the period estimated intrinsic value, participants were asked 
whether they would still like to submit the offer to the market or not. It is possible that different 
trigger values may have yielded different results, however, exploring those additional variations 
is beyond the scope of this study. There is a significant direct evidence that nudging affected 
participants. “Table 17: Cancelled Offers by Treatment Type” uses Pearson’s Chi2 test to 
compare the two binary variables (cancelled / not cancelled). The results show that 198 offers out 
of 2691 (7.36 percent) were cancelled in the general nudge groups and 431 offers out of 2434 
(17.71 percent) were cancelled in the specific nudge groups after the nudge popup. It is apparent 
that specific nudges are more effective than general nudges in triggering offer cancellation. 
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Table 19: Cancelled Offers by Treatment Type 
Treatment Type Not Cancelled Cancelled Cancel Percent Total 
General Nudge 2493 198 7.36% 2691 
Specific Nudge 2003 431 17.71% 2434 
Summary 4496 629 12.27% 5125 
Pearson chi2(1) = 127.1452   Pr = 0.000 
Additionally, “Table 20: Cancelled Sell Offers by Treatment Type” and “Table 21: Cancelled 
Buy Offers by Treatment Type” show that there were more sell offers than buy offers in the 
market. They also show that higher proportion of sell offers were cancelled compared to buy 
offers due to nudging. This can be explained by the endowment effect - nudging reminded 
participants that they own the asset, and also provided the asset real value and, in turn, 
participants decided to cancel their offer and keep their assets. 
Table 20: Cancelled Sell Offers by Treatment Type 
Treatment Type Not Cancelled Cancelled Cancel Percent Total 
General Nudge 1517 118 7.2% 1635 
Specific Nudge 1048 301 22.3% 1349 
Summary 2565 419 14% 2984 
Pearson chi2(1) = 139.5512   Pr = 0.000 
 
Table 21: Cancelled Buy Offers by Treatment Type 
Treatment Type Not Cancelled Cancelled Cancel Percent Total 
General Nudge 976 80 7.6% 1056 
Specific Nudge 955 130 12% 1085 
Summary 1931 210 9.8% 2141 
Pearson chi2(1) = 11.7425   Pr = 0.001 
Based on the information from the above three tables, it can be inferred that sell offers are more 
affected by nudging compared to buy offers, and that both are more affected by specific nudges 
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compared to general nudges. Additional support for the above, showing the effect of nudges on 
participants’ behaviour in the general and specific nudges compared to the baseline groups, in 
the form of reduced “Offers-Participants ratio” and “Contracts-Participants ratio”, has been 
provided earlier in this chapter (Offers and Contracts section).                  
Another notable aspect is the effect of the proposed offer price, and its’ difference from the 
intrinsic value for that period. Nudge treatment participants were only nudged when the value of 
their proposed sell/buy offer, was higher or lower by at least 5 percent compared to the period 
intrinsic value. A total of 4,425 offers above this threshold were identified in the nudge 
treatments. Out of those offers, 629 (14.21%) were cancelled. From “Table 22: Cancelled Offers 
by Difference from Intrinsic Value”, it appears that participants did not make decisions to cancel 
their offers based on the percentage difference from intrinsic value. All three nudge ranges 5% < 
25% (14.4%), 25% <= 50% (13.4%), > 50% (14.6%) did not differentiate significantly in 
cancellation rate. Additional analysis of different percentage groups was conducted to ensure that 
the above results are representative. The additional analysis used ten groups that ranged between 
0 to 100 percent difference from the intrinsic value. As in this range, the results did not indicate 
that any specific group had significantly more cancellations than others. 
Table 22: Cancelled Offers by Difference from Intrinsic Value 
Difference from 
Intrinsic Value 
Not Cancelled Cancelled Cancel Percent Total 
< 5% 700 0 0% 700 
5% < 25% 1560 263 14.4% 1823 
25% <= 50% 1020 158 13.4% 1178 
> 50% 1216 208 14.6% 1424 
Summary 4496 629 12.3% 5125 
Pearson chi2(3) = 114.4069   Pr = 0.000 
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The participants’ final rank is also a possible predictor to offer cancelation tendency. From the 
results in “Table 23: Cancelled Offers by Final Rank” below, it can be seen that the majority of 
cancellations are made by participants who are ranked between the fourth place and the seventh 
place. A possible explanation to this distribution, is that the most successful participants 
understood the value of the asset, and therefore did not require to cancel their offers as frequently. 
Vice versa, the least successful participants did not understand the asset value, nor did they 
follow the suggestions provided by the nudges, leading to a low cancellation rate. It is important 
to highlight that most groups had less than 10 participants, so as an alternative, the data in this 
table should be analysed from the ninth’ ranked participant to the first ranked participant in offer 
to reflect the groups distribution. 
Table 23: Cancelled Offers by Final Rank 
Final Rank Not Cancelled Cancelled Cancel Percent Total 
1 806 21 2.5% 827 
2 446 23 4.9% 460 
3 553 60 9.8% 613 
4 219 40 15.4% 259 
5 440 193 30.5% 633 
6 500 115 18.7% 615 
7 369 81 18% 450 
8 325 34 9.5% 359 
9 677 59 8% 736 
10 161 3 1.8% 164 
Summary 4496 629 12.3% 5125 
Pearson chi2(9) = 366.3751   Pr = 0.000 
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4.10 Correlations  
Selected variables related to demographics, risk preferences and performance, were used to 
assess correlation, mainly focusing on correlations between these variables and the cancellation 
and price difference from the period intrinsic value. 
Table 24: Correlations 
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Treatment Type 0.2849 
(0.000) 
       
Period 0.0046 
(0.657) 
0.0618 
(0.000) 
      
Price difference from IV -0.0788 
(0.000) 
-0.3314 
(0.000) 
-0.1087 
(0.000) 
     
Final Rank 0.0835 
(0.000) 
0.0966 
(0.000) 
0.0052 
(0.619) 
-0.0707 
(0.000) 
    
English as first language 0.1048 
(0.000) 
0.0358 
(0.001) 
-0.0400 
(0.000) 
-0.0465 
(0.000) 
0.1985 
(0.000) 
   
Anglo-Saxon Ancestry 0.0084 
(0.421) 
-0.1517 
(0.000) 
-0.0021 
(0.839) 
0.0871 
(0.000) 
0.0819 
(0.000) 
0.4865 
(0.000) 
  
Risk Profile -0.0227 
(0.038) 
-0.0883 
(0.000) 
-0.0108 
(0.324) 
0.0031 
(0.776) 
0.0466 
(0.000) 
0.0435 
(0.000) 
-0.0714 
(0.000) 
 
Female -0.0417 
(0.000) 
-0.0986 
(0.000) 
-0.0276 
(0.008) 
-0.0939 
(0.000) 
-0.0212 
(0.042) 
0.0669 
(0.000) 
0.0445 
(0.000) 
0.0893 
(0.000) 
* Results reflect correlation between the presented variables. p values are provided in parentheses, 
rounded to three decimal places. Participants identified as English, Irish, Scottish and Australian 
were flagged as Anglo-Saxon ancestry. 
 
The correlation assessment in the table above shows that there is a strong and significant 
correlation between cancellation of offers and the treatment type, that is, the higher the treatment 
type, the more cancellations are made. Since baseline groups’ treatment type equals zero, general 
nudge equals one, and specific nudge equals two, the results align with previous Chi2 analysis 
made in this chapter. Conversely, the correlation table shows that the larger the price difference 
from the period intrinsic value, the less chance the offer will be cancelled. Participants’ final 
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rank also correlates positively with offer cancellation, suggesting that participants that finished at 
lower ranking, are more likely to follow the nudge advice, and cancel their offers. This can be 
explained by lack of trading experience, and comprehension of the market mechanism. English 
as first language also improved the chance of cancellation. This follows the expectation 
presented in the methods chapter, that both the semantic and comparative cues will be more 
effective on English speaking participants. However, Anglo-Saxon ancestry does not seem to 
significantly correlate with offer cancellation. The table also reveals a negative and significant 
correlation between the participants’ risk profile and offer cancellation. This suggests that 
participants with higher risk profile tend to cancel less offers, than participants with lower risk 
profile, that is, ignore the nudge. Female participants show mild negative tendency to cancel 
offers. Negative correlation of trading periods with price difference from intrinsic value suggests 
that as participants become more familiar with the market mechanism, and gain experience, they 
tend to trade closer to the intrinsic value. This is aligned with previous behavioural finance 
double auction studies (Smith et al. 1988). 
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4.11 Regression  
Several regression models were inspected. The models mainly focused on offers execution price, 
and offer cancellation due to applied nudging or lack thereof.  
Logistic regression model I 
Model: 
Offer Cancelled Yes Noi,t =  𝛼 +
 𝛽Treatment Type
i,t
+βlog (Price Difference from Intrinsic Value)
i,t
+βLanguage at Home
i,t
 + βFemalei,t+ ϵt  
Reasoning and outcome: 
This logistic regression estimated the odds of an offer being cancelled by participants, due to the 
nudge treatment. Therefore, baseline groups were excluded from this model. The proposition 
behind this model, is that the specific nudge is more effective than the general nudge, as 
previously confirmed using Pearson’s chi2 test in “Table 18: Cancelled Offers by Treatment 
Type”. In conjunction with this, the difference in price between the offered price and the intrinsic 
value, has some minor negative effect on the cancellation decision. Additionally, as previously 
confirmed using Pearson’s chi2 test in “Table 16: Cancelled Offers by Language at Home”, the 
spoken language at the home of the participant, has also strong effect on offer cancellation 
decisions. Participants from families where English is the first spoken language, have 
significantly higher odds of cancelling offers compared to participants speaking most other 
languages as their first language. This can be explained by the fact that they are more likely to 
understand the nudges, have less cognitive load, and therefore will be more influenced and act 
according to the nudge suggestion (Keysar et al. 2012). To control for gender, a dummy variable 
was added. The model is statistically significant for all coefficients except for the gender dummy 
variable. The R2 value (8.79 percent) is normal for this type of behavioural research, and is not 
posing an issue explaining the model variation. 
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Table 25: Results from Logistic Regression I 
 
Results from Logistic Regression I* 
Dependent Variable: Cancelled Offer Yes/No 
Treatment Type = General Nudge - 
Treatment Type = Specific Nudge 2.527*** 
(0.279) 
log (Price difference from period 
Intrinsic Value) 
1.342*** 
(0.041) 
Language at Home = English - 
Language at Home = Cantonese 0.212*** 
(0.061) 
Language at Home = Arabic 1.375 
(0.270) 
Language at Home = Mandarin 0.421*** 
(0.054) 
Language at Home = Vietnamese 0.513*** 
(0.109) 
Language at Home = Indian origin 
languages 
0.584*** 
(0.111) 
Language at Home = Indonesian 
origin languages 
0.667** 
(0.129) 
Language at Home = Other 0.256*** 
(0.059) 
Female 1.046 
(0.113) 
Wald chi2 (10) 
Prob. > chi2 
252.19 
0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.0879 
Observations 5125 
* Results reflect the odds of the dependant variable occurring. In both Treatment Type and 
Language at Home independent variables, the values are compared to the base value in each 
group which is marked with “-“. Significance at the 5% and 1% levels of confidence is 
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indicated with ** and ***, respectively. Robust standard errors are provided in parentheses, 
rounded to three decimal places.   
 
Logistic regression model II  
An additional logistic regression model was developed to support the mitigating effect of nudge 
treatments on turnover, the sum of executed offers divided by number of available asset. The 
model also included the dividend distributed in the previous period, as well as a dummy variable 
to control for the participants’ gender differences. 
Model: 
Offer executed Yes Noi,t =  𝛼 +
 𝛽Treatment Type
i,t
+βlog(Price Difference from Intrinsic Value)
i,t
+ βPrevious Period Dividendi,t + βFemalei,t+ ϵt  
Reasoning and outcome: 
This model estimates that offers will have less odds of execution in the general nudge treatment 
compared to the baseline groups and even less than that in the specific nudge treatments. The 
model included the previous period dividend in order to verify whether there is any effect 
between the size of the dividend and the odds of executing offers in the following period. 
Interestingly, the finding from this regression shows that the higher the dividend payed in the 
previous period the lower the odds of an offer execution. This suggests that participants may 
actually behaved contrary to the “hot hand” and become more risk averse in the presence of high 
dividend in the previous period, perhaps believing that the next dividend drawn will be lower, 
therefore yielding lower asset intrinsic value. The model is statistically significant for all 
coefficients except for the gender dummy variable. 
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The results supported this model as outlined the following table: 
Table 26: Results from Logistic Regression II 
 
Results from Logistic Regression II* 
Dependent Variable: Executed Contract Yes/No 
Treatment Type = Baseline - 
Treatment Type = General Nudge 0.720*** 
(0.042) 
Treatment Type = Specific Nudge 0.277*** 
(0.016) 
log (Price difference from period 
Intrinsic Value) 
0.805*** 
(0.014) 
Previous Period Dividend 0.996*** 
(0.001) 
Female 0.978 
(0.047) 
Wald chi2 (5) 
Prob. > chi2 
558.72 
0.000 
Pseudo R-squared 0.047 
Observations 9236 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
* Results reflect the odds of the dependant variable occurring. In Treatment Type independent 
variable, the value presented are compared to the base value in each group which is marked with 
“-“. Significance at the 1% level of confidence is indicated with ***. Robust standard errors are 
provided in parentheses, rounded to three decimal places. 
 
 
 
 
 79 
 
Linear regression model I 
An additional linear regression model was developed to investigate the mitigating effect of 
nudge treatments on price difference from intrinsic value. 
Model: 
Price difference from intrinsic valuei,t =  𝛼 +  𝛽General Nudgei,t +  𝛽Specific Nudgei,t+ βFemalei,t+ βPeriodi,t+ ϵt 
Reasoning and outcome: 
This model aims to show that nudge treatments are an effective way to reduce the deviation of 
trading price from intrinsic value, compared to the baseline groups which used no nudges. The 
model also controls for gender, and incorporates period trading effect on experience, which is 
also expected to reduce price deviation from intrinsic value. Preliminary analysis of the intra-
class correlation between “participant unique id” and “price difference from intrinsic value” 
variables yielded 41 percent. Therefore, the model was clustered by participants, to ensure that 
the variation originated from between the participants is removed (Hedeker et al. 1994). This 
model estimates that both the general and specific nudge treatments will result in offer prices that 
are significantly less deviating from the intrinsic value compared to the baseline groups. 
Additionally, it was found that later periods reduce the deviation from the intrinsic value, which 
can be explained by improved trading experience. Females also trade closer to the intrinsic value, 
compared to males and ‘other gender’. The results are outlined in “Table 27: Results from Linear 
Regression I” below: 
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Table 27: Results from Linear Regression I 
  Linear regression. Clustered by participants’ ids 
Dependent Variable: Price difference from intrinsic value 
Offer (1) 
Seller offer 
(2) 
Buyer offer 
General Nudge -312.879*** 
(68.111) 
-232.928*** 
(24.322) 
Specific Nudge -341.088*** 
(83.122) 
-207.030*** 
(29.337) 
Female -122.657** 
(61.198) 
1.536 
(24.374) 
Period -10.064** 
(5.046) 
-6.388*** 
(2.134) 
Constant 583.834*** 
(122.107) 
377.380*** 
(35.382) 
F-statistic 
Prob. > F 
6.55*** 
0.0001 
24.51*** 
0.000 
R-squared 0.157 0.207 
Observations 
Number of 
groups1 
4,293 
82 
4,943 
82 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01 
1
A participant in one of the general nudge treatments decided not to trade.  
  
Therefore, the number of groups is smaller than the number of participants.  
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4.12 Summary  
This chapter presented the results of the experiments that were performed during this study. The 
findings indicate that nudges are an effective tool to reduce differences between offer and 
contract prices and the intrinsic value of the assets. The selected nudges are also an effective tool 
to capture the participants’ attention to overvalued and undervalued offers, as demonstrated by 
the significant number of overvalued and undervalued offer cancellations. The results chapter 
also demonstrated that differences in first spoken language have significant effects on offer 
cancellation. The following chapter provides further discussion and conclusions.  
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5. Discussion 
The previous chapters provided the supporting theoretical background, justification and 
description of the methods used, and the outcomes of the experiments. This chapter discusses 
limitation and criticism of the methods and how they were addressed before, during, and after the 
experiments. This chapter also offer various ways to extend this research beyond the scope of 
this thesis, and most importantly, discusses how the outcome of this research could be applied in 
the real world, outside the laboratory. 
5.1 Contribution and Future Extensions 
By introducing the use of nudges in an experimental financial asset setting, this study contributes 
to the nudge literature, as it clearly shows that, the selected nudges influence decision making in 
a controlled continuous double auction asset market environment. The adaptive price pattern in 
some of the nudge groups, can suggest that these nudges are also useful in promoting faster asset 
valuation, and therefore may help market participants to learn about asset valuation components 
(in this case dividend stream) over the long run. While it seems that these findings are limited in 
their nature to a controlled continuous double auction asset market environment, with a known 
asset intrinsic value, it can be argued that the same principles used in this thesis, can be applied 
in real-life, to other assets that have a known intrinsic value or a solid valuation consensus.  
One relevant example is auction sites like eBay. Except for unique and scarce items, common 
products offered on eBay will normally have a well-known market value, which reflects the 
market equilibrium, while allowing for minor fluctuation. To improve its’ customers experience, 
eBay currently offers an indicator in the form of a “trending price”, reflecting this equilibrium 
price for some products. Due to the nature of auction sites, the initial offering, and the final 
agreed transaction price, may vary significantly from the equilibrium price. Moreover, even 
products that are offered as an outright buy (“buy it now”), may be overvalued. Using the 
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nudging mechanism to alert market participants to overvalued bids, will reduce financial loses by 
aligning the trading bids to the market equilibrium price. 
Future extension can also use other nudges or variations of the nudges used. For example, 
“Enhanced Active Choice”, a nudge derived from “Active Choice” which is forcing users to 
make a choice between options while highlighting the losses caused by choosing the alternative, 
“wrong” option, was proven to be more effective than “Active Choice” (Keller et al. 2011) and 
therefore, may improve the results of this study. Additional extensions can also come in the form 
of altering nudge messages, and/or nudge trigger thresholds. This will allow future studies to 
explore potentially more effective messages and thresholds, that will favourably encourage 
participants to cancel overvalued offers. 
5.2 Limitations 
While this thesis is constrained in scope and funding, the number and variety of participants was 
on par with similar studies in this field. This allowed for meaningful statistical results. 
Nevertheless, the author feels that a larger population would have allowed for additional 
repetition of this thesis, sustaining the results, and perhaps identifying additional behavioural 
patterns amongst ancestry, languages and genders. 
The use of random assignment as part of the group allocation certainly has merit. However, due 
to the nature of the experiments, where more than one participant took part in each contract, the 
random assignment limited the demographic inference from this study. As such, the variation in 
the treatment groups’ population, reduced the ability to conclude that a specific construct such as, 
gender or ancestry contributed to a specific behavioural pattern. Future studies should consider 
specific demographic groups instead of random assignments, to allow focused investigation of 
demographic influences on trading behaviour. 
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Another limitation worth addressing is the access to finance industry professional participants. 
Such access could show whether the nudges applied on the general population, which 
predominantly consisted of students, are also effective and valuable when targeting professionals. 
Methodology criticism and resolution    
Kirchler and colleagues suggested that under this type of experimental settings, financially 
inexperienced participants, who may not understand the double auction trading mechanism, and 
are not familiar with asset valuation, must be provided with sufficient instructions. They argued 
that if such instructions are not provided, some participants are likely to be confused, which, in 
turn, is likely to significantly contribute to bubble formation, invalidating this methodology 
(Huber and Kirchler 2011; Kirchler et al. 2012). To address this concern, participants were 
provided with asset valuation training prior to the experiment trading session. Participants were 
also provided with asset value information sheet (value table), that could be used during the 
trading sessions. In this study, participants were provided with the estimated intrinsic value of 
the asset at any given time, and in all three experimental variations. Participants were also 
required to complete a set of control questions to demonstrate basic understanding of the values 
table, and the intrinsic values of the asset throughout the experiment. By employing this in all 
variations, the claim of confusion and misunderstanding is significantly reduced, and therefore 
the differences in treatments’ outcome could be attributed to the treatments’ variations, rather 
than to any other knowledge and confusion issues.  
 
According to Lei et al. (2001) the methodology that was used in this study may cause boredom, 
which in turn attracts active participation, and therefore affects the turnover, and perhaps the 
likelihood of placing offers that have not been placed otherwise. The three different experimental 
group types in this study used the same experimental settings, with the only difference being the 
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nudges, and similar to the benchmark studies, were executed under similar conditions. Thus, 
even if participants traded at times out of boredom, they were likely to do so in all experimental 
groups, as they did in the benchmark studies, therefore, the effect of boredom can be negated as a 
causal effect for differences between groups.  
5.3 Conclusion 
Stock market participants have been known to be affected by herding, and the tendency to 
speculate. When experienced at the same time, both often lead to investments at a value which 
surpasses the intrinsic value of the purchased asset. Once these assets converge back to their 
intrinsic value, participants who bought assets above their intrinsic value face significant 
financial loses. This study acknowledged this phenomenon and, by using a well-known 
experimental economics/finance bubble triggering methodology (Smith et al. 1988), replicated 
this behaviour in laboratory settings, and measured three well accepted bubble formation 
measures: price amplitude, normalised absolute deviation, and turnover (King et al. 1993; Porter 
and Smith 1995; Van Boening et al. 1993) to assess its severity. This study also aimed to 
mitigate this phenomenon by using several nudging techniques in different treatment groups. 
Two research questions were addressed by this thesis. The first research question ‘How will 
different intrinsic value general nudging methods impact price amplitude, normalised absolute 
deviation, and turnover in an experimental setting?’ and its’ related sub hypotheses, showed that 
price amplitude and normalised absolute deviation are significantly lower in the general nudge 
treatment groups compared to the baseline groups, thus supporting alternative hypotheses 1.1 and 
1.2. However, the differences in turnover between these groups have not been deemed significant, 
thus rejecting alternative hypothesis 1.3. The lack of significant difference between the baseline 
and the general nudge treatments can be explained by a single general nudge group with 
extremely high turnover. Additional studies may ascertain whether this is an anomaly or not. 
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Therefore, Null hypothesis 1: ‘Participants who are nudged with general information will not 
trade at a different price amplitude, normalised absolute deviation and turnover, than those who 
are not nudged’ can only be partially rejected, making this nudge effective, with some limitations.  
The second research question ‘How will different intrinsic value specific nudging methods 
impact price amplitude, normalised absolute deviation, and turnover in an experimental setting?’ 
and its’ related sub hypotheses, showed that price amplitude, normalised absolute deviation and 
in turnover are all significantly lower in the general nudge treatment groups compared to the 
baseline groups, thus supporting alternative hypotheses 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3. Therefore, Null 
hypothesis 2: ‘Participants who are nudged with specific information will not trade at a different 
price amplitude, normalised absolute deviation and turnover, than those who are not nudged’ can 
be fully rejected, making this nudge completely effective. 
The results above align with the underlying behavioural difference between the treatment types. 
In the baseline groups, where no nudges were applied, participants’ behaviour resembled 
previous studies (Porter and Smith 2003; Smith et al. 1988; Smith et al. 2000). Speculation and 
herding predominantly pushed the asset price well above the intrinsic value, forming price 
bubble, until a point where the bubble burst, forcing the asset price down towards its’ intrinsic 
value. In the nudge treatments, participants trading patterns tend to converge closer to the 
intrinsic value, hundreds of over-valued offers were cancelled, and mostly, the turnover of assets 
was lower than the baseline groups. These data therefore confirm that the effect of the selected 
nudges, in this context, is suitable to mitigate asset bubble formation. 
Although accurate valuation of financial assets in a non-laboratory environment can be 
challenging, and inherently, applying these nudges to assets without accurately valuing them 
may be perceived as unreliable and therefore may not be as effective, the findings of this study 
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indicate that these nudges are effective when an asset value can be assessed. Therefore, in 
markets where an intrinsic value of an asset can be assessed accurately, application of the nudges 
presented in the thesis may save market participants unnecessary loses by reducing purchases of 
overvalued assets. 
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Appendix A – Experiment instructions  
Behavioural Business Lab 
INSTRUCTIONS 
We would like to start by thanking you for choosing to participate in this experiment. Below is additional 
information and detailed instructions for this experiment. 
About the experiment 
This experiment is used to understand how people make decisions under uncertainty in an asset market. 
Experiment details 
• You will start this experiment by answering 3 questions used to ensure you understand the 
concepts explained in this document. If you feel that you require assistance, please raise your 
hand so that we could address your questions. 
• This will be followed by the asset market task, which is made out of:  
1. A practice period of 5 minutes (300 seconds). Here you will be given the opportunity to 
understand how the trading environment functions. This period does not count towards 
your achievements nor does it affect your experimental dollars (E$) or experimental 
stocks (ES), so please feel free to practice the trading screen without hesitation. 
2. Followed by fifteen (15) trading periods of 2 minutes (120 seconds). You will receive an 
initial endowment of 10,000 E$ and 10 ES which allow you to make decisions whether to 
buy, sell or refrain from trading with the other participants. 
• At the end of the asset market task you will be presented with a questionnaire. 
• Once the questionnaire is complete, you will receive your payment. 
• The overall length of this experiment is approximately 60 minutes. 
Trading 
• You will be in a group with up to 9 other randomly selected participants. 
• In each period you are free to choose whether to buy, sell or refrain from trading with the other 
group members. It is up to you to decide what is the best approach to end up with the most E$. 
• You can only buy assets if you have enough funds to do so. 
• You can only sell assets if you have enough assets for sale. 
• At the end of each period all unmatched sell or buy orders will be cancelled. If you wish to place 
an order with the same price, you can place a new order in the next period.  
• At the end of each period (including the last period) you will receive a payment (dividend) for 
each ES you own. The dividend is randomly drawn and can be in the range of 0E$ to 50E$. All 
participants receive the same dividend. For example, if you hold 10 ES and the dividend drawn 
was 30E$, you will receive 300E$ for that round, which will be added to your total E$. 
• At the end of the last trading period and after the final dividend was paid, any assets you own will 
be bought by the system (buyout) at a random value between 50E$ to 250E$. The sum of money 
you will receive will be added to your total E$. For example, if you hold 10 ES at the conclusion 
of trading, and the final payment drawn was 100E$, you will receive 1000E$, which will be 
added to your total E$. 
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How to use the Trading System – Buying and Selling 
In this experiment you will be trading assets (stocks) using a dedicated screen. A sample image of the 
trading screen is provided to you. The screen has the following components: 
1. Period indicator – Indicates which period you are currently in (out of 15 periods). 
2. Time Indicator – Indicates how much time is remaining in this period (out of 120 sec).  
3. Assets Indicator – Indicates the following: 
a. Your unique id for this experiment. 
b. How many E$ you have. 
c. How many dividends you have been paid so far. 
d. How many assets you currently own. 
4. Trading box – If you would like to buy or sell an asset, you could use this area to nominate a 
price by typing it in the box, and either place a sell order or buy order for that price. Each time 
you press one of the buttons, you create a single asset sell or buy order with your nominated 
price. Your orders are consequently listed in the “Sell List” and “Buy List”.  
5. Buy list and Sell list: 
a. Sell List – Lists all currently available sell offers, including your own sell offers (if you 
made any). You can cancel your own orders (marked with * under the “Participant’s 
Offer” column) by pressing “Cancel Order”. You can purchase an asset, if you have 
enough funds, by selecting a line and pressing on “BUY”. 
b. Buy List – Lists all currently available buy offers, including your own buy offers (if you 
made any). You can cancel your own orders (marked with * under the “Participant’s 
Offer” column) by pressing “Cancel Order”. You can sell an asset, if you have enough 
assets, by selecting a line and pressing on “SELL”. 
6. Transaction History – Lists all executed orders for this period with their Id, Price and Time (in 
seconds since the period started). 
7. Transaction Graph – Lists all executed orders for this period in a graphical format. 
8. Trading Indicator – Indicates the following: 
a. The last completed transaction price. 
b. How many available E$ you have for trading. That is, if you have an outstanding buy 
order/s, the software will deduct this amount from your available E$. 
You cannot place any buy orders if your available E$ are 0. 
c. How many available assets you currently own. That is, if you placed any sell order/s the 
software will deduct this amount from your available trading assets. You cannot place 
any sell orders if your available assets are 0. 
9. Show Instructions – pressing this button will show you key notes from these instructions, as well 
as the estimated real values calculation table which is also provided to you. 
Please note:  
• When buying/selling assets, the system will identify if your offer is higher/lower than 5% of the 
real value of the asset (see “Estimated real value calculation table”). If your offer is within the 5% 
real value range your selection will progress without additional activities. If your offer is outside 
the 5% real value range, you will be presented with an additional screen asking you to confirm 
your selection.1 
• Orders that are awaiting completion, for example, they are in the middle of a buy/sell activity, are 
marked as locked (marked with * under the “Locked” column) and are not available for you while 
in this status. 
Your benefits (and how they are calculated) 
• You will receive 10$ (AUD) as show-up fee.  
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• You will also receive an additional payment as a result of your choices during this experiment - 
you will be ranked against the other participants in your group based on the total experimental 
dollars (E$) you have at the end of the experiment. The participant with the highest E$ amount 
will be ranked first and will receive additional 20$ AUD (30$ AUD in total). The participant with 
the second highest E$ will be ranked second and will receive additional 18$ AUD and so forth. 
Your choices count! 
 
1 This text was only presented to the nudge groups. It did not appear in the baseline groups instructions. 
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Estimated real values calculation table 
To help you with your choices, you are provided with an “Estimated real values calculation table”. This table lists estimated real values for a single asset at 
the end of each period. As the dividends and the buyout values are drawn at random, values listed are an average of all possible drawn values. It is up to 
you to decide whether you want to trade at those prices, at other prices or to refrain from trading. 
Current 
Period 
Remaining periods 
(including this period) 
Estimated dividend 
payment (average) in 
E$ 
Remaining dividend 
payments (average) in 
E$ 
Buyout value 
(average) in E$ 
Estimated real value per 
share (average) in E$ 
1 15 25 375  525 
2 14 25 350  500 
3 13 25 325  475 
4 12 25 300  450 
5 11 25 275  425 
6 10 25 250  400 
7 9 25 225  375 
8 8 25 200  350 
9 7 25 175  325 
10 6 25 150  300 
11 5 25 125  275 
12 4 25 100  250 
13 3 25 75  225 
14 2 25 50  200 
15 1 25 25 150 175 
 
• The dividend payment value is a random value which changes each period. Values can be drawn between 0 – 50 E$.  
 
• At the end of the experiment all assets are bought at the random “buyout” price which can be a value between 50E$ – 250E$. 
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Appendix B – Training instructions 
Behavioural Business Lab 
Training – Buying and Selling 
Instructions 
You will now be allowed a training period. During this training session we would like you to explore the 
trading screen and perform the following activities: 
• Place a Buy order – using the trading box (trading screen component #4), set your desired price 
in the text box and then press “Create BUY Order”. You should now see your order in the “Buy 
List” (trading screen component #5). You will also see that the amount you offered is deducted 
from your “Experimental Dollars Available (E$)” in the Trading Indicator area (trading screen 
component #8).  
• Place a Sell order – using the trading box (trading screen component #4), set your desired price in 
the text box and then press “Create SELL Order”. You should now see your order in the “Sell 
List” (trading screen component #5). You will also see that the asset (share) you offered is 
deducted from your “Number of assets available for trading” in the Trading Indicator area 
(trading screen component #8). 
• Buy an asset from the “Sell List” – using the “Sell List” (trading screen component #5), click a 
line with your desired purchase price and then press “BUY”. Provided you had enough E$ to 
purchase that asset and that no one else bought the same asset before you, you should now see 
that the asset (share) you bought was added to your “Number of assets owned” and to the 
“Number of assets available for trading”. You will also see that the amount you bought the asset 
for was deducted from your “Experimental Dollars (E$)” and “Experimental Dollars Available 
(E$)”. 
• Sell an asset to the “Buy List” – using the “Buy List” (trading screen component #5), click a line 
with your desired selling price and then press “SELL”. Provided you had enough assets to sell 
that asset and that no one else sold an asset at the price before you, you should now see that the 
asset (share) you sold was deducted from your “Number of assets owned” and “Number of assets 
available for trading”. You will also see that the amount you sold the asset for was added to your 
“Experimental Dollars (E$)” and “Experimental Dollars Available (E$)”. 
• Cancel an order – If you don’t have an outstanding order, please place one now (either buy or 
sell). Select your order from the relevant list ( “Buy List” or “Sell List”) by clicking on the order 
line. Your order line should be marked now. Click on the “Cancel Order” button. You should see 
a prompt asking you whether you would like to cancel this order or not. Please confirm the 
cancellation. You should now see that the order was removed from the relevant list. You should 
also see that your “Number of assets available for trading” (when cancelling a SELL order) or 
“Experimental Dollars Available (E$)” (when cancelling a BUY order) will be updated 
appropriately. 
As mentioned before, all activities performed during this training session will not count towards your 
overall trading performance and are solely meant to improve your understanding of the trading screens 
and trading mechanism. In case you have any questions, please raise your hand and we will attend to you 
shortly. 
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Appendix C – Experimental software screenshots 
I. Trading Screens 
 
a) Screen 1 – Welcome 
This is the first screen, it used to welcome the participants 
Screen Text 
Welcome! 
 
Please read the printed instructions carefully. 
If you have any questions during the experiment, please raise your hand and we will approach you. 
Once you are certain that you understand the instructions, please click on the continue button below. 
 
Screen Layout 
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b) Screen 2 – Control Questionnaire 
This screen will be used to assert that the experiment participants understood the “holding calculation table” (see 
next page) and the share prices throughout the experiment. 
Screen Text 
 
Control Questionnaire 
The following questions are for checking your understanding of the instructions. 
1. Suppose  
You bought a share in period 1 and sold it at the start of period 6. How much do you expect to receive in 
dividends for holding this share? 
ANSWER: _______________ 
2. Suppose  
It is period 12. You just bought a share and you intend to keep it until the end of the experiment. What is 
the average holding value of the share? 
ANSWER: _______________ 
3. Suppose  
It is the start of period 15. You just bought 2 shares and you intend to keep them until the end of the 
experiment. What is the combined (sum) average holding value of the shares? 
ANSWER: _______________ 
 
Screen Layout 
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c) Screen 3 – Training Completion 
This screen will be shown after the participant has completed the trading training period and before the 15 trading 
periods commence. 
 
Screen Text 
 
Congratulations! 
 
You have completed your training. 
We shall now progress to the next stage of this experiment 
 
Screen Layout 
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d) Screen 4 – CDA Intro 
This screen will be displayed to the participants before each trading period. 
Screen Text 
 
Trading Instructions (recap) 
Remember: 
• Each period is 2 minutes long (120 seconds). 
• In each period you can choose whether to buy, sell or refrain from trading. It is up to you to 
decide what is the best approach to end up with the most E$. 
• You can only buy assets if you have enough funds to do so. 
• You can only sell assets if you have enough assets for sale. 
• At the end of the period all unexecuted orders will be cancelled. If you wish to place an order 
with the same price, you can place a new order in the next period. 
• At the end of the period you will receive a payment (dividend) for each ES you own. The 
dividend is randomly drawn and can be in the range of 0E$ to 50E$. All participants receive the 
same dividend. For example, if you hold 10 ES and the dividend drawn was 30E$, you will 
receive 300E$ for that round, which will be added to your total E$. 
 
Screen Layout 
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Training Intro 
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e) Screen 5 – CDA Actual 
This is the screen used for the Continuous Double Auction throughout all periods (training and experimental). 
 
Screen Text 
 
N/A 
 
Screen Layout – Trading screen 
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Screen Layout – Intrinsic Value popup for variation 2 – general nudge 
 
Seller 
 
 
Buyer 
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Screen Layout – Intrinsic Value popup for variation 3 – Specific nudge 
 
Seller 
 
Buyer 
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Screen Layout – Instructions and Holding values table 
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Flow charts - Proposer 
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Flow charts - Accepter 
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f) Screen 6 – CDA Period Outcome 
 
Screen Text 
 
Period Outcome 
 
Dear participant 
At the end of period #x 
Your asset holdings were: x ES 
The dividend drawn for this period was x ES 
Therefore, you will receive a dividend of x E$ for your asset holdings 
This, sets your current cash holdings at x E$ 
Screen Layout 
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g) Screen 7 – CDA Final Outcome 
  
Screen Text 
 
Final Outcome 
Dear participant 
The first part of the experiment is now complete. 
At the end of the trading  
Your cash amount was: x E$ 
Your asset holdings were: x ES 
The final buyout drawn was x E$ for each asset. 
Therefore, the value of your assets is x E$ 
 
Your final cash amount is x E$ 
This ranks you at position: x and entitles you for a payment of: x AUD 
Your showup fee is: 10 AUD 
Therefore, your total payment today is: x AUD 
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Screen Layout 
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II. Questionnaire 
The questionnaire will look into aspects which cannot be addressed via the trading experiments. Questions are 
addressing the following: 
 
h) Screen 8 – Exit Questionnaire Screen 1 - Demographics 
Variables that may affect risk attitudes and experience. 
 
Screen Text 
 
Questions: 
1. What is your gender? 
1. Male 
2. Female 
3. Other 
4. Prefer not to say 
 
2. What is your age? 
free text (please type zero if you prefer not to say) 
 
3. What is your height? 
free text (please type zero if you prefer not to say) 
 
4. Do you speak a language other than English at home? 
1. No, English only 
2. Yes, Italian 
3. Yes, Greek 
4. Yes, Cantonese 
5. Yes, Arabic 
6. Yes, Mandarin 
7. Yes, Vietnamese 
8. Yes, other – please specify 
free text 
 
5. What is your ancestry? 
Provide up to two ancestries only. 
1. English 
2. Irish 
3. Italian 
4. German 
5. Chinese 
6. Scottish 
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7. Australian 
8. Other - please specify 
free text 
 
6. Are you or have you ever studied Economics, Finance, Business, Statistics, Management 
or Maths at a diploma, bachelor level or higher? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
 
Screen Layout 
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i) Screen 9 – Exit Questionnaire Screen 2 - Trading Experience 
 
Screen Text 
 
Questions: 
1. Have you ever bought or sold derivatives such as options or futures contracts? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
2. Have you ever bought or sold stocks or bonds? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
3. Have you ever bought any other investment products, such as exchange traded funds 
(ETFs) or Structured Products (SP)? 
1. Yes 
2. No 
4. On average, how frequently do you trade? 
1. I never trade 
2. I trade once a year 
3. I trade once a month 
4. I trade once a week 
5. I trade once or more every day 
 
Screen Layout 
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j) Screen 10 – Exit Questionnaire Screen 3 - Risk Attitude 
 
Screen Text 
 
1. How do you see yourself: are you generally a person who is fully prepared to take risks 
or do you try to avoid taking risks? Please tick a box on the scale,  
where the value 0 means: ‘not at all willing to take risks’  
and the value 10 means: ‘very willing to take risks’ 
 
2. More specifically: are you a person who is fully prepared to take financial risks or do you 
try to avoid taking financial risks? Please tick a box on the scale,  
where the value 0 means: ‘not at all willing to take risks’  
and the value 10 means: ‘very willing to take risks’ 
 
  
“For the next 7 questions, please refer to the following - you have some savings and you can 
only choose between two investment options: 
A: Buy a particular stock: Its return rate will vary. 
B: Keep the money in a savings account: Its return rate is fixed. 
(The term return rate refers to annual return rate. For example, a return rate of 2% means that for 
every $100 you invest, you will get $2 extra after a year.) 
Each scenario below describes the return rates of the two options. Read each scenario carefully 
and choose the option you would choose in that scenario.” 
3. Scenario 1:  
1. Stock: either 0% or 10% with equal probabilities 
2. Savings: exactly 2% 
4. Scenario 2:  
1. Stock: either 0% or 10% with equal probabilities 
2. Savings: exactly 3% 
5. Scenario 3:  
1. Stock: either 0% or 10% with equal probabilities 
2. Savings: exactly 4% 
6. Scenario 4:  
1. Stock: either 0% or 10% with equal probabilities 
2. Savings: exactly 5% 
7. Scenario 5:  
1. Stock: either 0% or 10% with equal probabilities 
2. Savings: exactly 6% 
8. Scenario 6:  
1. Stock: either 0% or 10% with equal probabilities 
2. Savings: exactly 7% 
9. Scenario 7:  
1. Stock: either 0% or 10% with equal probabilities 
2. Savings: exactly 8% 
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Screen Layout 
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k) Screen 11 – Exit Questionnaire Screen 4 - Feedback 
 
Screen Text 
 
“This section will allow you to provide information about the experiment you just completed. 
This information will be used to improve the software and future experiments.” 
 
Questions: 
1. Have you experienced any technical issues or misunderstanding during this experiment? 
If so, please provide as specific information as possible 
Free text 
2. Do you have any other comments or ideas for improvement of this experiment? 
Free text 
 
 
Screen Layout 
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Appendix D – Experimental software variables 
I. globals Table 
Name Type Default Check Description 
DEFAULT_PRICE_LAYOUT Number 1 Mod (1) The default price layout for all trading transactions. 
Currently all trades are at a full dollar trade, i.e. no 
0.1$ can be made. 
DEFAULT_PERCENT_LAYOUT Number 0.01  The default percent layout for all trading transactions.  
DEFAULT_TEXT_LAYOUT Number 200  The default text layout for all text fields. This is the 
max length of text possible. 
MINIMUM_TRADE_PRICE Number 1  The minimum trade price for all trading transactions. 
Currently 1$. 
MAXIMUM_TRADE_PRICE Number 10000  The maximum trade price for all trading transactions. 
Currently 10,000$. 
DEFAULT_CONTRACT_VOLUME Number 1  The default for the contracts table.  Currently only 1 
asset can be bought at a time. 
AVG_PERIOD_DIVIDEND Number 25  The average dividend drawn per period. 
AVG_FINAL_DIVIDEND Number 150  The average dividend drawn for the buyout. 
CONTRACT_TYPE_NI Number 0  Contract type not initiated. 
CONTRACT_TYPE_BUY_PROP Number 11  Contract type buy. Proposer 
CONTRACT_TYPE_BUY_ACPT Number 12  Contract type buy. Accepter 
CONTRACT_TYPE_SELL_PROP Number 21  Contract type sell. Proposer 
CONTRACT_TYPE_SELL_ACPT Number 22  Contract type sell. Accepter 
CONTRACT_STATUS_NI Number 0  Pre Contract / Contract status not initiated. 
PRE_CONTRACT_STATUS_CRE Number 11  Pre Contract status created at pre contract stage. 
PRE_CONTRACT_STATUS_UNM Number 12  Pre Contract status unmatched (due to proposed order 
cancelled) at pre contract stage. 
PRE_CONTRACT_STATUS_CAN Number 13  Pre Contract status cancelled at pre contract stage. 
PRE_CONTRACT_STATUS_TER Number 14  Pre Contract status terminated (due to end of period). 
CONTRACT_STATUS_AV Number 21  Contract status available. 
CONTRACT_STATUS_EX Number 22  Contract status executed. 
CONTRACT_STATUS_CAN Number 23  Contract status cancelled. 
CONTRACT_STATUS_TER Number 24  Contract status terminated (due to end of period). 
CONTRACT_UNLOCKED Number 0  The contract is unlocked. All activities can be made.  
Used by LockedStatus 
CONTRACT_LOCKED                            Number 1  The contract is locked until current activities are 
complete. Used by LockedStatus 
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INITIAL_PERIOD Number 0  This is the first period that the subject will trade in. If 
there's a training period, this will be set to 0, otherwise 
to 1 
TRAINING_PERIODS Number 1  The number of training periods 
TRADING_PERIODS Number NumPeriods  The number of trading periods. Will be used to set 
entry conditions into some screens, e.g. exit 
questionnaire 
TRADING_DURATION Number 120  The duration of each trading period in seconds (e.g. 
120 = 2 minutes) 
INITIAL_CASH Number 10000  The amount of cash each subject starts with 
INITIAL_ASSETS Number 10  The number of assets (stocks) each subject starts with 
TSU Number 100 (NumberOfSubjects / 
NumberOfGroups) *  
INITIAL_ASSETS 
Total stock of units. TSU equals the sum of all 
traders’ inventories of the asset. Calculated per group. 
TOP_RANKED_PAYMENT Number 20  The amount a subject will receive for being ranked 
first at the end of the experiment 
RANK_DEDUCTION Number 2  The amount deducted for each rank decline 
EXPERIMENTAL_ASSET Text “ES”   
EXPERIMENTAL_CURRENCY Text "E$"   
PAYMENT_CURRENCY Text "AUD"   
TREATMENT_TYPE_BASELINE Number 0  The baseline “treatment”, similar to VS (1988). 
TREATMENT_TYPE_NUDGE_VAR1 Number 1  Nudge variation #1. A simple nudge treatment 
TREATMENT_TYPE_NUDGE_VAR2 Number 2  Nudge variation #2. A nudge with numeric values 
treatment 
TreatmentType Number 0  Defines the treatment type used 
IVSensitivity Number 5  Defines the Intrinsic Value sensitivity in percent. For 
treatments 2 and 3. 
Percentage difference from IV Calculation (move to 
relevant pop-up area): 
((abs(ContractPrice - \PeriodIntrinsicValue) 
/\PeriodIntrinsicValue) > (\IVSensitivity/100)) 
NumberOfGroups Number 1  GROUP settings. Can this be retrieved from zTree? 
NumberOfSubjects Number  subjects.maximum(Subject)  
GroupSize Number  NumberOfSubjects / 
NumberOfGroups 
number of subjects per group 
NumberOfDividendOptions Number 6   
DividendOptions array (6)  0, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 
PeriodNAD Number 0  A quick access variable to hold the period Normalised 
Absolute Deviation for calculations. 
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PeriodPA Number 0  A quick access variable to hold the period Price 
Amplitude for calculations. 
PeriodTurnover Number 0  A quick access variable to hold the period Turnover 
for calculations. 
OverallNAD Number 0  A quick access variable to hold the overall 
Normalised Absolute Deviation for calculations. 
OverallPA Number 0  A quick access variable to hold the overall Price 
Amplitude for calculations. 
OverallTurnover Number 0  A quick access variable to hold the overall Turnover 
for calculations. 
PeriodIV Number 0  A quick access variable to hold the current period IV 
for calculations. 
TreatmentStartTime Number  gettime()  
CDAStartTime Number   The time the CDA has started. 
Will only be set once for all groups 
CDAPeriodStartTime array (number of 
groups) 
 The time the CDA has started for this period. This is 
set for each group. 
LastContractCloseTime Number 0  The time the last executed contract has been closed 
LastContractPrice  Number 0  The last executed contract price. 
LastContractId Number 0  System generated unique contract id assigned to every 
newly created contract. 
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II. subjects & subjectsHist Tables 
Name Type Default Check Description 
Group Number 0  Ranging from 1 to 3 
SelfId Number 0  Ranging from 1 to 10 
Session Number 0   
Treatment Number 0  Holds the treatment applied to this participant 
NumberOfSharesOwned Number 0  The total number of share the subject has, whether 
available or not 
NumberOfAvailableShares Number 0  The number of available share the subject to trade. 
i.e. any shares on offer are not counted as available. 
Cash Number 0  The total cash amount the subject has, whether 
available or not. This may be different than 
FinalCash. 
CashAvailable Number 0  The total available cash the subject has. This does not 
include any moneys allocated for asset purchasing 
which are still pending. 
DividendsPayed Number 0  Dividends payed for this period. 
TotalDividendsPayed Number 0  Total dividends payed over all periods. 
ProfitInPeriod Number 0  The total profit the subject has made in the period. 
This will be similar to DividendsPayed except for the 
last round where there's a buyout (AKA final 
dividend). 
ShowUpFee Number 0  This will be set at the last period (screen 11SB) from 
the background settings (session object). 
FinalRank Number 0  The final rank of the subject based on the subject's 
performance. 
FinalRankPayment Number 0  The payment for the final rank. 
FinalDividendValue Number 0  Support variable for CDA final outcome 
FinalCash Number 0  For final cash calculation. 
     
CQ1 Number 0 125 Check the answer for control question #1 
No history required. 
CQ2 Number 0 250 Check the answer for control question #2 
No history required. 
CQ3 Number 0 350 Check the answer for control question #3 
No history required. 
ShowInstructions Number 0  Support variable to control whether to show the 
instructions screen or not. 
       121 
ShowBaselinePrompt Number 0 ** CURRENTLY REMOVED ** Support variable to control whether to show baseline 
treatment screen or not. 
ShowVar1Prompt Number 0  Support variable to control whether to show 
treatment variation #1 screen or not. Transaction 
value dependent. 
ShowVar2Prompt Number 0  Support variable to control whether to show 
treatment variation #2 screen or not. Transaction 
value dependent. 
LastProposerId Number 0  Support variable used to get contract data from 
contracts creation box to Var1Prompt & Var2Prompt 
LastProposedContractId Number 0  Support variable used to get contract data from 
contracts creation box to Var1Prompt & Var2Prompt 
LastProposedContractAvail Number 0 No = 0 
Yes = 1 
Support variable used to get contract data from 
contracts creation box to Var1Prompt & Var2Prompt 
LastPreContractId Number 0  Support variable used to get contract data from 
contracts creation box to Var1Prompt & Var2Prompt 
LastPreContractPrice Number 0  Support variable used to get contract data from 
contracts creation box to Var1Prompt & Var2Prompt 
LastPreContractType Number 0  Support variable used to get contract data from 
contracts creation box to Var1Prompt & Var2Prompt 
----------------------------------------- ------------ ---------- ------------------------------ --------------------------------------------------------- 
Gender Number 0 Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 4 
Options: 
Male = 1 
Female = 2 
Other = 3 
Prefer not to say = 4 
Age Number 0 Minimum = 0 
Maximum = 120 
 
Height Number 0 Minimum = 0 
Maximum = 250 
 
LanguageAtHome Number 0  1. No, English only 
2. Yes, Italian 
3. Yes, Greek 
4. Yes, Cantonese 
5. Yes, Arabic 
6. Yes, Mandarin 
7. Yes, Vietnamese 
8. Yes, other – please specify 
(free text) 
LanguageAtHomeText Text    
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Ancestry Number 0  1. English 
2. Irish 
3. Italian 
4. German 
5. Chinese 
6. Scottish 
7. Australian 
8. Other - please specify 
(free text) 
AncestryText Text    
Major Number 0  No = 0 
Yes = 1 
DerivativesExperience Number 0  No = 0 
Yes = 1 
EquityExperience Number 0  No = 0 
Yes = 1 
InvestmentProductsExperience Number 0  No = 0 
Yes = 1 
TradingFrequency Number 0 Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 5 
Options: 
I never trade = 1 
I trade once a year = 2 
I trade once a month = 3 
I trade once a week = 4 
I trade once or more every day = 5 
GeneralRiskTaking Number  Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 10 
 
FinancialRiskTaking Number  Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 10 
 
RiskScenario1 Number  Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 2 
 
RiskScenario2 Number  Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 2 
 
RiskScenario3 Number  Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 2 
 
RiskScenario4 Number  Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 2 
 
RiskScenario5 Number  Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 2 
 
RiskScenario6 Number  Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 2 
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III. contracts Table 
 
RiskScenario7 Number  Minimum = 1 
Maximum = 2 
 
FeedbackTechnical Text    
FeedbackIdeas Text    
Name Type Default Check Description 
ContractId Number 0  This will hold a unique identifier for each contract 
ContractGroup Number 0  The group this contract is used by 
Creator Number 0  The contract creator. This is the Proposer of the 
contract. 
SellerId Number 0  The seller id 
ContractType Number 0  The contract type: 0 = not initiated; 1 = buy contract; 
2 = sell contract 
ContractPrice Number 0  The price of the contract as submitted by the seller 
Volume Number 1  The volume of this contract (how many assets are 
traded). Currently 
DEFAULT_CONTRACT_VOLUME 
BuyerId Number 0  The buyer Id 
ContractOpenTime Timestamp 0  When this contract was opened by the buyer/seller 
ContractCloseTime Timestamp 0  When was this contract was closed. Either by the 
buyer/seller OR because it was bought OR the period 
has concluded without any outcome. 
ContractStatus Number 0  The current contract status: 0 = not initiated; 1 = 
cancelled at pre contract stage; 2 = available; 3 = 
executed; 4 = cancelled; 5 = terminated due to end of 
period 
LockedStatus Number 0  The current contract record locked status. Used to 
ensure that no contracts are cancelled, bought or sold 
during a change to the record by another user. 
Options are: 
0 = unlocked; 1 = locked 
